Sunday, July 31, 2005
Military RhetIraq: US Military Lawyers
Who: Air Force Capt. John Carr, Maj. Robert Preston & Colonel Frederick L. Borch
Source: NY Times & Associated Press (via Findlaw)
Quotes:
As the Pentagon was making its final preparations to begin war crimes trials against four detainees at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, two senior prosecutors complained in confidential messages last year that the trial system had been secretly arranged to improve the chance of conviction and to deprive defendants of material that could prove their innocence.
In his March 2004 message, Captain Carr told Colonel Borch that "you have repeatedly said to the office that the military panel will be handpicked and will not acquit these detainees and we only needed to worry about building a record for the review panel" and academicians who would pore over the record in years to come. Captain Carr said in the message that the problems could not be dismissed as personality differences, as some had tried to depict them, but "may constitute dereliction of duty, false official statements or other criminal conduct." He added that "the evidence does not indicate that our military and civilian leaders have been accurately informed of the state of our preparation, the true culpability of the accused or the sustainability of our efforts." The office, he said, was poised to "prosecute fairly low-level accused in a process that appears to be rigged."
"I expected there would at least be a minimal effort to establish a fair process and diligently prepare cases against significant accused," Carr wrote. "Instead, I find a halfhearted and disorganized effort by a skeleton group of relatively inexperienced attorneys to prosecute fairly low-level accused in a process that appears to be rigged."
In his electronic message, Captain Carr said the prosecution team had falsely stated to superiors that it had no evidence of torture of Ali Hamza Ahmed Sulayman al-Bahlul of Yemen. In addition, Captain Carr said the prosecution team had lost an F.B.I. document detailing an interview in which the detainee claimed he had been tortured and abused.
Major Preston, in his e-mail message of March 11, 2004, said that pressing ahead with the trials would be "a severe threat to the reputation of the military justice system and even a fraud on the American people."
Colonel Borch: "I am convinced to the depth of my soul that all of us on the prosecution team are truly dedicated to the mission of the office of military commissions," he wrote, "and that no one on the team has anything but the highest ethical principles."
Source: NY Times & Associated Press (via Findlaw)
Quotes:
As the Pentagon was making its final preparations to begin war crimes trials against four detainees at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, two senior prosecutors complained in confidential messages last year that the trial system had been secretly arranged to improve the chance of conviction and to deprive defendants of material that could prove their innocence.
In his March 2004 message, Captain Carr told Colonel Borch that "you have repeatedly said to the office that the military panel will be handpicked and will not acquit these detainees and we only needed to worry about building a record for the review panel" and academicians who would pore over the record in years to come. Captain Carr said in the message that the problems could not be dismissed as personality differences, as some had tried to depict them, but "may constitute dereliction of duty, false official statements or other criminal conduct." He added that "the evidence does not indicate that our military and civilian leaders have been accurately informed of the state of our preparation, the true culpability of the accused or the sustainability of our efforts." The office, he said, was poised to "prosecute fairly low-level accused in a process that appears to be rigged."
"I expected there would at least be a minimal effort to establish a fair process and diligently prepare cases against significant accused," Carr wrote. "Instead, I find a halfhearted and disorganized effort by a skeleton group of relatively inexperienced attorneys to prosecute fairly low-level accused in a process that appears to be rigged."
In his electronic message, Captain Carr said the prosecution team had falsely stated to superiors that it had no evidence of torture of Ali Hamza Ahmed Sulayman al-Bahlul of Yemen. In addition, Captain Carr said the prosecution team had lost an F.B.I. document detailing an interview in which the detainee claimed he had been tortured and abused.
Major Preston, in his e-mail message of March 11, 2004, said that pressing ahead with the trials would be "a severe threat to the reputation of the military justice system and even a fraud on the American people."
Colonel Borch: "I am convinced to the depth of my soul that all of us on the prosecution team are truly dedicated to the mission of the office of military commissions," he wrote, "and that no one on the team has anything but the highest ethical principles."
Presidential RhetIraq: Pres. Carter
Who: Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter
Source: Washington Post
Quotes:
"I think what's going on in Guantanamo Bay and other places is a disgrace to the U.S.A.," he told a news conference at the Baptist World Alliance's centenary conference in Birmingham, England. "I wouldn't say it's the cause of terrorism, but it has given impetus and excuses to potential terrorists to lash out at our country and justify their despicable acts."
Carter said, however, that terrorist acts could not be justified, and that while Guantanamo "may be an aggravating factor ... it's not the basis of terrorism."
"What has happened at Guantanamo Bay ... does not represent the will of the American people," Carter said Saturday. "I'm embarrassed about it, I think its wrong. I think it does give terrorists an unwarranted excuse to use the despicable means to hurt innocent people."
"I thought then, and I think now, that the invasion of Iraq was unnecessary and unjust. And I think the premises on which it was launched were false," he said Saturday.
Source: Washington Post
Quotes:
"I think what's going on in Guantanamo Bay and other places is a disgrace to the U.S.A.," he told a news conference at the Baptist World Alliance's centenary conference in Birmingham, England. "I wouldn't say it's the cause of terrorism, but it has given impetus and excuses to potential terrorists to lash out at our country and justify their despicable acts."
Carter said, however, that terrorist acts could not be justified, and that while Guantanamo "may be an aggravating factor ... it's not the basis of terrorism."
"What has happened at Guantanamo Bay ... does not represent the will of the American people," Carter said Saturday. "I'm embarrassed about it, I think its wrong. I think it does give terrorists an unwarranted excuse to use the despicable means to hurt innocent people."
"I thought then, and I think now, that the invasion of Iraq was unnecessary and unjust. And I think the premises on which it was launched were false," he said Saturday.
Pundit RhetIraq: Dr. Gunaratna
Who: Dr. Rohan Gunaratna (Terrorism Expert)
Source: Agence France Presse via The Daily Star (Lebanon)
Quotes:
"The epicenter of international terrorism ... has shifted from Afghanistan in Asia to the Middle East, that is to Iraq," Gunaratna, regarded as one of the world's authorities on Al-Qaeda, told a financial security conference here.
Source: Agence France Presse via The Daily Star (Lebanon)
Quotes:
"The epicenter of international terrorism ... has shifted from Afghanistan in Asia to the Middle East, that is to Iraq," Gunaratna, regarded as one of the world's authorities on Al-Qaeda, told a financial security conference here.
"Like Afghanistan produced the last generation of terrorists, Iraq will produce the next generation," he said.
"When they come back, they will have certain capabilities, certain knowledge and the threat of violence will spread," he told delegates at the Asia-Pacific Financial Crime conference.
"So the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq has not reduced the threat of terrorism in any way. This is the most significant development we have seen in the past three years."
"[...] in place of Al-Qaeda we have seen 30 or 40 different groups emerge," he said, adding that the world must accept that terrorism had become a globalized threat that cannot be eradicated.
Saturday, July 30, 2005
British RhetIraq: MI5 Report
Who: MI5 British Security Service
Source: MI5
Quotes: From report entitled, "THREAT TO THE UK FROM INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM"
The threat to the UK from international terrorism remains real and serious and an attack or multiple attacks may be mounted without warning, as was demonstrated in central London on 7 July 2005. The threat comes from a diverse range of sources, including Al Qaida and associated networks, and those who share Al Qaida's ideology but do not have direct contact with them. A threat could manifest itself from a lone individual or group, rather than a larger network.
Though they have a range of aspirations and "causes", Iraq is a dominant issue for a range of extremist groups and individuals in the UK and Europe. Some individuals who support the insurgency are known to have travelled to Iraq in order to fight against coalition forces. In the longer term, it is possible that they may later return to the UK and consider mounting attacks here.
Source: MI5
Quotes: From report entitled, "THREAT TO THE UK FROM INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM"
The threat to the UK from international terrorism remains real and serious and an attack or multiple attacks may be mounted without warning, as was demonstrated in central London on 7 July 2005. The threat comes from a diverse range of sources, including Al Qaida and associated networks, and those who share Al Qaida's ideology but do not have direct contact with them. A threat could manifest itself from a lone individual or group, rather than a larger network.
Though they have a range of aspirations and "causes", Iraq is a dominant issue for a range of extremist groups and individuals in the UK and Europe. Some individuals who support the insurgency are known to have travelled to Iraq in order to fight against coalition forces. In the longer term, it is possible that they may later return to the UK and consider mounting attacks here.
US Government RhetIraq: GAO Report
Who: United States Government Accountability Office
Source: Government Accountability Office
Quotes: From GAO-05-876 Report - Issued July 28, 2005
Note: Bolding is mine. This is an extremely long post, but this report is so comprehensive and informative that abbreviating the post would not have done the report justice.
As of March 2005, the United States, Iraq, and international donors had pledged or made available more than $60 billion for security, governance, and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The United States provided about $24 billion (for fiscal years 2003 through 2005) largely for security and reconstruction activities. Of this amount, about $18 billion had been obligated and about $9 billion disbursed (see Note 1 below). The State department has reported that since July 2004, about $4.7 billion of $18.4 billion in fiscal year 2004 funding has been realigned from large electricity and water projects to security, economic development, and smaller immediate impact projects.
The U.S. has completed projects in Iraq that have helped to restore basic services, such as rehabilitating oil wells and refineries, increasing electrical generation capacity, restoring water treatment plants, and reestablishing Iraqi basic health care services. However, as of May 2005, Iraq’s crude oil production and overall power generation were lower than before the 2003 conflict, although power levels have increased recently; some completed water projects were not functioning as intended; and construction at hospital and clinics is under way. Reconstruction efforts continue to face challenges such as rebuilding in an insecure environment, ensuring the sustainability of completed projects, and measuring program results.
... according to senior military officials, the insurgency in Iraq has grown in size, complexity, and intensity and has affected reconstruction priorities.
... restoring and sustaining Iraq’s crude oil production and export capacity have been slower than originally planned, and these levels were lower in May 2005 than in March 2003. Similarly,Iraq’s overall power generation through May 2005 was lower than before the 2003 conflict, although power generation exceeded this level in the latter part of June 2005. Progress in the water sector is difficult to measure, and some completed water construction projects are not functioning as intended. Finally, health care projects to expand the availability of basic health care, such as constructing facilities and providing medical equipment, are under way as of May 2005.
In October 2004, the administration reported that it had reallocated appropriated funds from the $18.4 billion fiscal year 2004 emergency supplemental based on a review of all U.S. reconstruction funding priorities. The administration reported that it had reprogrammed about $1.8 billion to security and law enforcement and about $1.2 billion to economic and private sector development and governance activities. These funds were reallocated from future water and electricity infrastructure projects. In addition, about $450 million in the oil sector had been reprogrammed from refined fuel imports to oil reconstruction projects.
In April 2005, the administration reported that it had reallocated $832 million—$225 million for job creation activities and $607 million for essential services projects and programs. To fund these efforts, the embassy cancelled five longer term potable water projects and future energy projects.
International donors have pledged about $13.6 billion in support of Iraq reconstruction over a 4-year period from 2004 through 2007. Of this amount, about $10 billion, or 70 percent, is in the form of loans, primarily from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Donars have pledged the remaining $3.6 billion as grants, to be provided multilaterally or bilaterally.
Initial activities to restart the oil infrastructure have largely been completed; however, activities to sustain production and export levels have been slower than originally planned and these levels remained below pre- March 2003 conflict capacity, as of May 2005. Progress has been made in rehabilitating electric facilities and generation capacity has been increased.
While the water and sanitation program has made some progress toward completing a reduced scope of activities, this progress has been difficult to measure and some completed projects have not functioned as intended. The U.S. program to expand basic health care has made progress in helping reestablish health services in Iraq, but larger health infrastructure projects remained under way as of May 2005.
Considerable looting after Operation Iraqi Freedom and continued attacks on crude and refined product pipelines have contributed to Iraq’s reduced oil production and export capacities.
In responding to our draft report, State indicated that this level of attacks [to oil pipelines in 2004] demonstrates the effectiveness of the insurgency in Iraq and the inability of coalition forces to register the security of the oil infrastructure as a high priority.
The electricity sector faces a number of challenges to meeting Iraq’s electricity needs, including the lack of appropriate fuel supplies, Iraqi operation and maintenance capacity, the unstable security environment, financing needs for distribution projects, and effective management of electricity generation and distribution.
As of May 2005, U.S.-funded projects reportedly had added or restored about 1900 megawatts of generating capacity to Iraq’s power grid. However, U.S. program and contracting officials have raised concerns about the ability of the Ministry of Electricity and local power plant operators to sustain the added generation capacity.
Iraq produced more than 100,000 megawatt-hours of electricity most days between July and November 2004; however, production dropped below prewar production levels through May 2005, varying between 51,000 and 99,800 megawatt-hours daily. In commenting on our draft report, State noted that planned outages are necessary operational procedures to ensure reliable and sustainable operations at the plants and that the central reason for high unplanned outages is that Ministry of Electricity workers do not yet have the necessary skills to ensure adequate operations and maintenance practices.
Iraq’s limited accessible supply of natural gas and diesel fuel affects the operation of the new gas combustion turbines provided by the United States and continues to affect the operations and production capacity of Iraq’s electrical power plants. [...] Due to limited access to natural gas, some gas combustion turbines at Iraqi power plants are operating on low grade, oil-based fuels. The use of liquid fuels, without adequate equipment modification and fuel treatment, decreases the power output of the turbines by up to 50 percent, requires three times more maintenance, and could result in equipment failure and damage that significantly reduces the life of the equipment, according to U.S. and Iraqi power plant officials.
[...] in December 2004, the Iraqis’ inability to operate a recently overhauled plant at Bayji led to a widespread power outage. [...] U.S. officials said that contractors installed the equipment and provided the Iraqis onsite training in operating the new or refurbished equipment. However, Iraqi power plant officials from 13 locations throughout Iraq, including Bayji, indicated that the training did not adequately prepare their staff to operate and maintain the new gas turbine engines. [...] A June 29, 2005, USAID Inspector General report stated that until the operations and maintenance challenges are addressed at both the Iraqi power plants and ministry levels and practices at the power plants are significantly improved, reports of damaged equipment and infrastructure will continue and the electrical infrastructure rebuilt and refurbished by USAID’s program will remain at risk of sustaining damage following its transfer to the Ministry of Electricity.
In March 2004, the United States awarded a $19 million contract to train and equip Iraq’s Electrical Power Security Service to protect electrical infrastructure, including power plants, transmission lines, and Ministry of Electricity officials. Although the program was designed to train 6,000 guards over a 2-year period, fewer than 340 guards had been trained when the contract was terminated early.
The Ministry of Electricity estimates that Iraq needs about $20 billion to restore its electricity sector, including over $3 billion to update the distribution network system, that provides electricity from the distribution station to the end user. The activities of the U.S. assistance program have focused on generation, transmission, and distribution projects to improve the electricity sector and have provided about $100 million to address the provision of power from the distribution station to the end user.
Experts indicate that the demand for electricity has increased dramatically since UN sanctions were removed in 2003 and estimate that the demand for electricity will exceed 8,500 megawatts this summer. In commenting on our draft report, the State department stated that the demand had passed 8,500 megawatts and may reach 9,000 megawatts.
State reallocations have reduced available U.S. funding for improving Iraq’s severely degraded water and sanitation sector from a peak of $4.6 billion to a current level of $2.4 billion. The United States has made some progress in completing large and small water and sanitation projects, but it is difficult to determine the impact of its reconstruction effort on this sector due to limited performance data and measures. The U.S. reconstruction program has also suffered from delays in completing projects, and some completed projects lack sufficient Iraqi staff and supplies to function properly or are not operating at all due to a lack of electricity and diesel fuel.
As of April 5, 2005, the State Department had reallocated funding for water and sanitation to other priorities such as security, thus reducing available funding by 48 percent to about $2.4 billion.
USAID’s accomplishments included the repair of six sewage treatment plants, two water treatment plants, and a primary urban water supply in southern Iraq. As of April 3, 2005, State reported that 64 projects were complete and 185 were in progress. However, State was unable to provide a list of those completed projects, which would enable us to evaluate the significance of the project numbers in terms of scope of work, cost, or size.
The effect of U.S. water and sanitation sector reconstruction is difficult to quantify, and metrics used by U.S. agencies to track progress do not provide a complete picture of results. The program has encountered delays in execution due to security conditions and other factors, and completed projects are at risk of failing due to lack of needed staff and supplies after transfer to the Iraqis.
In commenting on our draft report, USAID said that the agency tracks increases in the
amount of water treated and estimates increases in beneficiary numbers. However, these metrics do not address the quality of water and sanitation services in Iraq, which may hinder the U.S. ability to gauge progress toward its goal of providing essential services. For example, because of problems with the distribution network, water that is potable at the treatment plants may be contaminated by the time it reaches users.
While U.S. agencies have completed initial activities to reestablish Iraqi health services, larger infrastructure, equipment, and training projects to restore and expand the availability of basic health care are still under way. The Iraqi health sector faces a number of challenges in providing basic and preventive health services, including procurement and delivery of medical equipment and supplies and measuring program results.
According to agency reporting, initial activities to reestablish Iraqi health services have been largely completed, including the vaccination of 70 percent of eligible Iraqi children, about 5 million Iraqi children against measles, mumps, and rubella and 3 million children against polio; rehabilitation of 110 health clinics; training of about 700 health care trainers; and the procurement of medical equipment kits for 600 health centers. However, due to the security environment and procurement delays, 37 of 600 medical equipment kits had not been delivered as of May 20, 2005, according to U.S. officials.
[...] according to IRMO reporting, as of April 6, 2005, of the planned renovations for 20 hospitals and new construction for 1 hospital, the United States had started planned renovations on the 20 hospitals and begun construction of the Basrah Pediatric Facility. According to agency documentation, the execution phase of these health projects took longer than expected to complete due to the complex designs for health care facilities, long lead times for medical equipment manufacturing and delivery, construction delays due to land ownership issues, the poor quality of sites, and security issues related to the contractors and the delivery of construction supplies. In addition, according to U.S. officials, the training program for the medical staff for the new primary health clinics was expected to begin in June 2005.
According to the UN/World Bank assessments, Iraqi and agency documents, and U.S. officials, the Iraqi health sector will require continued long-term financial assistance to restore and strengthen its health system to modern day medical levels; support infrastructure maintenance and medical supply requirements; and support management operations—assistance that is not available in the U.S. program or through the international community.
Note 1: This amount does not include $5.7 billion appropriated in May 2005 for assistance to the Iraqi security forces in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror and Tsunami Relief, 2005, P.L. 109-13. In addition, it does not include $325 million from the same Act, which according to DOD, was released for the Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Iraq.
Source: Government Accountability Office
Quotes: From GAO-05-876 Report - Issued July 28, 2005
Note: Bolding is mine. This is an extremely long post, but this report is so comprehensive and informative that abbreviating the post would not have done the report justice.
As of March 2005, the United States, Iraq, and international donors had pledged or made available more than $60 billion for security, governance, and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The United States provided about $24 billion (for fiscal years 2003 through 2005) largely for security and reconstruction activities. Of this amount, about $18 billion had been obligated and about $9 billion disbursed (see Note 1 below). The State department has reported that since July 2004, about $4.7 billion of $18.4 billion in fiscal year 2004 funding has been realigned from large electricity and water projects to security, economic development, and smaller immediate impact projects.
The U.S. has completed projects in Iraq that have helped to restore basic services, such as rehabilitating oil wells and refineries, increasing electrical generation capacity, restoring water treatment plants, and reestablishing Iraqi basic health care services. However, as of May 2005, Iraq’s crude oil production and overall power generation were lower than before the 2003 conflict, although power levels have increased recently; some completed water projects were not functioning as intended; and construction at hospital and clinics is under way. Reconstruction efforts continue to face challenges such as rebuilding in an insecure environment, ensuring the sustainability of completed projects, and measuring program results.
... according to senior military officials, the insurgency in Iraq has grown in size, complexity, and intensity and has affected reconstruction priorities.
In October 2004, the administration reported that it had reallocated appropriated funds from the $18.4 billion fiscal year 2004 emergency supplemental based on a review of all U.S. reconstruction funding priorities. The administration reported that it had reprogrammed about $1.8 billion to security and law enforcement and about $1.2 billion to economic and private sector development and governance activities. These funds were reallocated from future water and electricity infrastructure projects. In addition, about $450 million in the oil sector had been reprogrammed from refined fuel imports to oil reconstruction projects.
In April 2005, the administration reported that it had reallocated $832 million—$225 million for job creation activities and $607 million for essential services projects and programs. To fund these efforts, the embassy cancelled five longer term potable water projects and future energy projects.
International donors have pledged about $13.6 billion in support of Iraq reconstruction over a 4-year period from 2004 through 2007. Of this amount, about $10 billion, or 70 percent, is in the form of loans, primarily from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Donars have pledged the remaining $3.6 billion as grants, to be provided multilaterally or bilaterally.
Initial activities to restart the oil infrastructure have largely been completed; however, activities to sustain production and export levels have been slower than originally planned and these levels remained below pre- March 2003 conflict capacity, as of May 2005. Progress has been made in rehabilitating electric facilities and generation capacity has been increased.
While the water and sanitation program has made some progress toward completing a reduced scope of activities, this progress has been difficult to measure and some completed projects have not functioned as intended. The U.S. program to expand basic health care has made progress in helping reestablish health services in Iraq, but larger health infrastructure projects remained under way as of May 2005.
Considerable looting after Operation Iraqi Freedom and continued attacks on crude and refined product pipelines have contributed to Iraq’s reduced oil production and export capacities.
In responding to our draft report, State indicated that this level of attacks [to oil pipelines in 2004] demonstrates the effectiveness of the insurgency in Iraq and the inability of coalition forces to register the security of the oil infrastructure as a high priority.
The electricity sector faces a number of challenges to meeting Iraq’s electricity needs, including the lack of appropriate fuel supplies, Iraqi operation and maintenance capacity, the unstable security environment, financing needs for distribution projects, and effective management of electricity generation and distribution.
As of May 2005, U.S.-funded projects reportedly had added or restored about 1900 megawatts of generating capacity to Iraq’s power grid. However, U.S. program and contracting officials have raised concerns about the ability of the Ministry of Electricity and local power plant operators to sustain the added generation capacity.
Iraq produced more than 100,000 megawatt-hours of electricity most days between July and November 2004; however, production dropped below prewar production levels through May 2005, varying between 51,000 and 99,800 megawatt-hours daily. In commenting on our draft report, State noted that planned outages are necessary operational procedures to ensure reliable and sustainable operations at the plants and that the central reason for high unplanned outages is that Ministry of Electricity workers do not yet have the necessary skills to ensure adequate operations and maintenance practices.
Iraq’s limited accessible supply of natural gas and diesel fuel affects the operation of the new gas combustion turbines provided by the United States and continues to affect the operations and production capacity of Iraq’s electrical power plants. [...] Due to limited access to natural gas, some gas combustion turbines at Iraqi power plants are operating on low grade, oil-based fuels. The use of liquid fuels, without adequate equipment modification and fuel treatment, decreases the power output of the turbines by up to 50 percent, requires three times more maintenance, and could result in equipment failure and damage that significantly reduces the life of the equipment, according to U.S. and Iraqi power plant officials.
[...] in December 2004, the Iraqis’ inability to operate a recently overhauled plant at Bayji led to a widespread power outage. [...] U.S. officials said that contractors installed the equipment and provided the Iraqis onsite training in operating the new or refurbished equipment. However, Iraqi power plant officials from 13 locations throughout Iraq, including Bayji, indicated that the training did not adequately prepare their staff to operate and maintain the new gas turbine engines. [...] A June 29, 2005, USAID Inspector General report stated that until the operations and maintenance challenges are addressed at both the Iraqi power plants and ministry levels and practices at the power plants are significantly improved, reports of damaged equipment and infrastructure will continue and the electrical infrastructure rebuilt and refurbished by USAID’s program will remain at risk of sustaining damage following its transfer to the Ministry of Electricity.
In March 2004, the United States awarded a $19 million contract to train and equip Iraq’s Electrical Power Security Service to protect electrical infrastructure, including power plants, transmission lines, and Ministry of Electricity officials. Although the program was designed to train 6,000 guards over a 2-year period, fewer than 340 guards had been trained when the contract was terminated early.
The Ministry of Electricity estimates that Iraq needs about $20 billion to restore its electricity sector, including over $3 billion to update the distribution network system, that provides electricity from the distribution station to the end user. The activities of the U.S. assistance program have focused on generation, transmission, and distribution projects to improve the electricity sector and have provided about $100 million to address the provision of power from the distribution station to the end user.
Experts indicate that the demand for electricity has increased dramatically since UN sanctions were removed in 2003 and estimate that the demand for electricity will exceed 8,500 megawatts this summer. In commenting on our draft report, the State department stated that the demand had passed 8,500 megawatts and may reach 9,000 megawatts.
State reallocations have reduced available U.S. funding for improving Iraq’s severely degraded water and sanitation sector from a peak of $4.6 billion to a current level of $2.4 billion. The United States has made some progress in completing large and small water and sanitation projects, but it is difficult to determine the impact of its reconstruction effort on this sector due to limited performance data and measures. The U.S. reconstruction program has also suffered from delays in completing projects, and some completed projects lack sufficient Iraqi staff and supplies to function properly or are not operating at all due to a lack of electricity and diesel fuel.
As of April 5, 2005, the State Department had reallocated funding for water and sanitation to other priorities such as security, thus reducing available funding by 48 percent to about $2.4 billion.
USAID’s accomplishments included the repair of six sewage treatment plants, two water treatment plants, and a primary urban water supply in southern Iraq. As of April 3, 2005, State reported that 64 projects were complete and 185 were in progress. However, State was unable to provide a list of those completed projects, which would enable us to evaluate the significance of the project numbers in terms of scope of work, cost, or size.
The effect of U.S. water and sanitation sector reconstruction is difficult to quantify, and metrics used by U.S. agencies to track progress do not provide a complete picture of results. The program has encountered delays in execution due to security conditions and other factors, and completed projects are at risk of failing due to lack of needed staff and supplies after transfer to the Iraqis.
In commenting on our draft report, USAID said that the agency tracks increases in the
amount of water treated and estimates increases in beneficiary numbers. However, these metrics do not address the quality of water and sanitation services in Iraq, which may hinder the U.S. ability to gauge progress toward its goal of providing essential services. For example, because of problems with the distribution network, water that is potable at the treatment plants may be contaminated by the time it reaches users.
While U.S. agencies have completed initial activities to reestablish Iraqi health services, larger infrastructure, equipment, and training projects to restore and expand the availability of basic health care are still under way. The Iraqi health sector faces a number of challenges in providing basic and preventive health services, including procurement and delivery of medical equipment and supplies and measuring program results.
According to agency reporting, initial activities to reestablish Iraqi health services have been largely completed, including the vaccination of 70 percent of eligible Iraqi children, about 5 million Iraqi children against measles, mumps, and rubella and 3 million children against polio; rehabilitation of 110 health clinics; training of about 700 health care trainers; and the procurement of medical equipment kits for 600 health centers. However, due to the security environment and procurement delays, 37 of 600 medical equipment kits had not been delivered as of May 20, 2005, according to U.S. officials.
[...] according to IRMO reporting, as of April 6, 2005, of the planned renovations for 20 hospitals and new construction for 1 hospital, the United States had started planned renovations on the 20 hospitals and begun construction of the Basrah Pediatric Facility. According to agency documentation, the execution phase of these health projects took longer than expected to complete due to the complex designs for health care facilities, long lead times for medical equipment manufacturing and delivery, construction delays due to land ownership issues, the poor quality of sites, and security issues related to the contractors and the delivery of construction supplies. In addition, according to U.S. officials, the training program for the medical staff for the new primary health clinics was expected to begin in June 2005.
According to the UN/World Bank assessments, Iraqi and agency documents, and U.S. officials, the Iraqi health sector will require continued long-term financial assistance to restore and strengthen its health system to modern day medical levels; support infrastructure maintenance and medical supply requirements; and support management operations—assistance that is not available in the U.S. program or through the international community.
Note 1: This amount does not include $5.7 billion appropriated in May 2005 for assistance to the Iraqi security forces in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror and Tsunami Relief, 2005, P.L. 109-13. In addition, it does not include $325 million from the same Act, which according to DOD, was released for the Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Iraq.
CIA RhetIraq: Gary Berntsen
Who: Ex-CIA Officer Gary Berntsen
Source: Associated Press (courtesy of Findlaw)
Quotes: From article entitled, "Former CIA officer sues to publish book detailing Osama bin Laden's escape"
The CIA is squelching publication of a new book detailing events leading up to Osama bin Laden's escape from his Tora Bora mountain stronghold during the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, says a former CIA officer who led much of the fighting.
In a story he says he resigned from the agency to tell, Gary Berntsen recounts the attacks he coordinated at the peak of the fighting in eastern Afghanistan in late 2001, including how U.S. commanders knew bin Laden was in the rugged mountains near the Pakistani border and the al-Qaida leader's much-discussed getaway.
Berntsen claims in a federal court lawsuit that the CIA is over-classifying his manuscript and has repeatedly missed deadlines written into its own regulations to review his book.
During the 2004 election, President George W. Bush and other senior administration officials repeatedly said that commanders did not know whether bin Laden was at Tora Bora when U.S. and allied Afghan forces attacked there in 2001.
"When I watched the presidential debates, it was clear to me ... the debate and discussions on Tora Bora were - from both sides - completely incorrect," said Berntsen, who won't provide details until the agency finishes declassifying his book. "It did not represent the reality of what happened on the ground."
Source: Associated Press (courtesy of Findlaw)
Quotes: From article entitled, "Former CIA officer sues to publish book detailing Osama bin Laden's escape"
The CIA is squelching publication of a new book detailing events leading up to Osama bin Laden's escape from his Tora Bora mountain stronghold during the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, says a former CIA officer who led much of the fighting.
In a story he says he resigned from the agency to tell, Gary Berntsen recounts the attacks he coordinated at the peak of the fighting in eastern Afghanistan in late 2001, including how U.S. commanders knew bin Laden was in the rugged mountains near the Pakistani border and the al-Qaida leader's much-discussed getaway.
Berntsen claims in a federal court lawsuit that the CIA is over-classifying his manuscript and has repeatedly missed deadlines written into its own regulations to review his book.
During the 2004 election, President George W. Bush and other senior administration officials repeatedly said that commanders did not know whether bin Laden was at Tora Bora when U.S. and allied Afghan forces attacked there in 2001.
"When I watched the presidential debates, it was clear to me ... the debate and discussions on Tora Bora were - from both sides - completely incorrect," said Berntsen, who won't provide details until the agency finishes declassifying his book. "It did not represent the reality of what happened on the ground."
Bush Admin RhetIraq: Sr. Admin Official
Note: I prefer to post quotes that are attributed to a specific person, but found this topic an interesting shift in rhetoric that may be worth noting.
Who: Bush Administration Senior Official
Source: The Daily Telegraph
Quotes: From Article entitled, "Don't mention war on terror, say Bush aides"
The "war on terror", the resonant catchphrase of the Bush administration for the past four years, is to be discreetly phased out in favour of more nuanced language, officials signalled yesterday.
Officials are instead starting to favour the rather less snappy phrase "struggle against violent extremism" as the administration puts increased stress on longer term initiatives - diplomatic, economic and educational - to defeat terrorism.
"The president is not going to abandon that ["war on terror"] language," the administration official said. "The armed conflict against terrorism is not being abandoned."
The new strategy is the fruit of an 18-month debate in the Pentagon after a famous October 2003 memo from Mr Rumsfeld in which he asked: "Are we winning the war on terror?"
Who: Bush Administration Senior Official
Source: The Daily Telegraph
Quotes: From Article entitled, "Don't mention war on terror, say Bush aides"
The "war on terror", the resonant catchphrase of the Bush administration for the past four years, is to be discreetly phased out in favour of more nuanced language, officials signalled yesterday.
Officials are instead starting to favour the rather less snappy phrase "struggle against violent extremism" as the administration puts increased stress on longer term initiatives - diplomatic, economic and educational - to defeat terrorism.
"The president is not going to abandon that ["war on terror"] language," the administration official said. "The armed conflict against terrorism is not being abandoned."
The new strategy is the fruit of an 18-month debate in the Pentagon after a famous October 2003 memo from Mr Rumsfeld in which he asked: "Are we winning the war on terror?"
Islamic RhetIraq: Fiqh Council of North America
Who: Fiqh Council of North America
Source: CAIR - Council on American-Islamic Relations
Quotes: From Fatwa Issued July 28, 2005 entitled, "U.S. MUSLIM RELIGIOUS COUNCIL ISSUES FATWA AGAINST TERRORISM"
The Fiqh Council of North America wishes to reaffirm Islam's absolute condemnation of
terrorism and religious extremism.
Islam strictly condemns religious extremism and the use of violence against innocent lives. There is no justification in Islam for extremism or terrorism. Targeting civilians’ life and property through suicide bombings or any other method of attack is haram – or forbidden - and those who commit these barbaric acts are criminals, not “martyrs.” The Qur’an, Islam’s revealed text, states: "Whoever kills a person [unjustly]…it is as though he has killed all mankind. And whoever saves a life, it is as though he had saved all mankind." (Qur’an, 5:32)
In the light of the teachings of the Qur’an and Sunnah we clearly and strongly state:
1. All acts of terrorism targeting civilians are haram (forbidden) in Islam.
2. It is haram for a Muslim to cooperate with any individual or group that is involved in any act of terrorism or violence.
3. It is the civic and religious duty of Muslims to cooperate with law enforcement authorities to protect the lives of all civilians.
We issue this fatwa following the guidance of our scripture, the Qur’an, and the teachings of our Prophet Muhammad – peace be upon him. We urge all people to resolve all conflicts in just and peaceful manners.
We pray for the defeat of extremism and terrorism. We pray for the safety and security of our country, the United States, and its people. We pray for the safety and security of all inhabitants of our planet. We pray that interfaith harmony and cooperation prevail both in the United States and all around the globe.
Note: The fatwa was endorsed by 163 Muslim organizations, mosques and imams, with an expectation of more being added.
Source: CAIR - Council on American-Islamic Relations
Quotes: From Fatwa Issued July 28, 2005 entitled, "U.S. MUSLIM RELIGIOUS COUNCIL ISSUES FATWA AGAINST TERRORISM"
The Fiqh Council of North America wishes to reaffirm Islam's absolute condemnation of
terrorism and religious extremism.
Islam strictly condemns religious extremism and the use of violence against innocent lives. There is no justification in Islam for extremism or terrorism. Targeting civilians’ life and property through suicide bombings or any other method of attack is haram – or forbidden - and those who commit these barbaric acts are criminals, not “martyrs.” The Qur’an, Islam’s revealed text, states: "Whoever kills a person [unjustly]…it is as though he has killed all mankind. And whoever saves a life, it is as though he had saved all mankind." (Qur’an, 5:32)
In the light of the teachings of the Qur’an and Sunnah we clearly and strongly state:
1. All acts of terrorism targeting civilians are haram (forbidden) in Islam.
2. It is haram for a Muslim to cooperate with any individual or group that is involved in any act of terrorism or violence.
3. It is the civic and religious duty of Muslims to cooperate with law enforcement authorities to protect the lives of all civilians.
We issue this fatwa following the guidance of our scripture, the Qur’an, and the teachings of our Prophet Muhammad – peace be upon him. We urge all people to resolve all conflicts in just and peaceful manners.
We pray for the defeat of extremism and terrorism. We pray for the safety and security of our country, the United States, and its people. We pray for the safety and security of all inhabitants of our planet. We pray that interfaith harmony and cooperation prevail both in the United States and all around the globe.
Note: The fatwa was endorsed by 163 Muslim organizations, mosques and imams, with an expectation of more being added.
Military RhetIraq: Gen. Casey
Who: General George Casey (U.S. Commander in Iraq)
Source: CNN
Quotes:
I do believe that if the political process continues to go positively and if the development of the security forces continues to go as it is going, I do believe we'll still be able to take some very substantial reductions after these elections in the spring and summer of next year.
The level of attacks they've been able to generate has not increased substantially here over what we've seen in the last year. This insurgency is not progressing.
Referring to the large-scale attacks mounted in recent weeks and months, Casey said "what you are seeing is a change in tactics to more violent, more visible attacks against civilians and that is a no-win strategy for the insurgency."
Source: CNN
Quotes:
I do believe that if the political process continues to go positively and if the development of the security forces continues to go as it is going, I do believe we'll still be able to take some very substantial reductions after these elections in the spring and summer of next year.
The level of attacks they've been able to generate has not increased substantially here over what we've seen in the last year. This insurgency is not progressing.
Referring to the large-scale attacks mounted in recent weeks and months, Casey said "what you are seeing is a change in tactics to more violent, more visible attacks against civilians and that is a no-win strategy for the insurgency."
Tuesday, July 26, 2005
British RhetIraq: P.M. John Major
Who: John Major (former British Prime Minister)
Source: Independent UK
Quotes:
"I think what has happened is not that the Iraq war and other policies created that threat, I think it was there and growing, though it was not in full bloom.
"I think it is possibly true that it has made it more potent and more immediate, but having said that, there is absolutely no doubt that we were going to have to confront terrorism at some time. And what I suppose you might say about the events of the Middle East is that they have brought it forward and brought it into focus."
Source: Independent UK
Quotes:
"I think what has happened is not that the Iraq war and other policies created that threat, I think it was there and growing, though it was not in full bloom.
"I think it is possibly true that it has made it more potent and more immediate, but having said that, there is absolutely no doubt that we were going to have to confront terrorism at some time. And what I suppose you might say about the events of the Middle East is that they have brought it forward and brought it into focus."
Saturday, July 23, 2005
Bush Admin RhetIraq: Security Advisors
Who: Stephen Hadley (US National Security Advisor) and Frances Townsend (US Homeland Security Advisor)
Source: NY Times
Quotes: From NY Times Op-Ed - What We Saw in London
Note: Bolding is my emphasis
First and most important, we must have a clear understanding of the ideology espoused by the enemy. The terrorists we face today aim to remake the Middle East in their own grim image - one that, as President Bush has said, "hates freedom, rejects tolerance and despises all dissent."
The second important lesson flows directly from the first. An ideological contest can be a long and difficult one. Even bankrupt ideas have attracted followers for a time. And in making our case, we must overcome America's mixed record on supporting freedom in the Middle East. For too long we accepted a false bargain that promised stability if we looked the other way when democracy was denied.
The third lesson is that the struggle against terrorism requires force of arms, but will not be won through force of arms alone. The victory in World War II was not complete until the Marshall Plan secured Germany's democratic political future. In the fight against Communism, our armed forces deterred the enemy. But it was the superior appeal of human freedom - not bombs and bullets - that ultimately led to democracy's triumph.
Source: NY Times
Quotes: From NY Times Op-Ed - What We Saw in London
Note: Bolding is my emphasis
First and most important, we must have a clear understanding of the ideology espoused by the enemy. The terrorists we face today aim to remake the Middle East in their own grim image - one that, as President Bush has said, "hates freedom, rejects tolerance and despises all dissent."
The second important lesson flows directly from the first. An ideological contest can be a long and difficult one. Even bankrupt ideas have attracted followers for a time. And in making our case, we must overcome America's mixed record on supporting freedom in the Middle East. For too long we accepted a false bargain that promised stability if we looked the other way when democracy was denied.
The third lesson is that the struggle against terrorism requires force of arms, but will not be won through force of arms alone. The victory in World War II was not complete until the Marshall Plan secured Germany's democratic political future. In the fight against Communism, our armed forces deterred the enemy. But it was the superior appeal of human freedom - not bombs and bullets - that ultimately led to democracy's triumph.
Friday, July 22, 2005
Independent RhetIraq: Iraq Body Count Organization
Who: Iraq Body Count
Source: A Dossier of Civilian Casualties in Iraq 2003–2005
Quotes:
Who was killed?
24,865 civilians were reported killed in the first two years.
Women and children accounted for almost 20% of all civilian deaths.
Baghdad alone recorded almost half of all deaths.
When did they die?
30% of civilian deaths occurred during the invasion phase before 1 May 2003.
Post-invasion, the number of civilians killed was almost twice as high in year two (11,351) as in year one (6,215).
Who did the killing?
US-led forces killed 37% of civilian victims.
Anti-occupation forces/insurgents killed 9% of civilian victims.
Post-invasion criminal violence accounted for 36% of all deaths.
Killings by anti-occupation forces, crime and unknown agents have shown a steady rise over the entire period.
How many were injured?
At least 42,500 civilians were reported wounded.
The invasion phase caused 41% of all reported injuries.
Note: "A Dossier on Civilian Casualties in Iraq, 2003-2005" is the first detailed account of all non-combatants reported killed or wounded during the first two years of the continuing conflict.
Source: A Dossier of Civilian Casualties in Iraq 2003–2005
Quotes:
Who was killed?
When did they die?
Who did the killing?
How many were injured?
Note: "A Dossier on Civilian Casualties in Iraq, 2003-2005" is the first detailed account of all non-combatants reported killed or wounded during the first two years of the continuing conflict.
Thursday, July 21, 2005
Iraqi RhetIraq: Victims of al-Khalij Neighborhood Terrorist Bombing
Who: Iraqi Victims of al-Khalij Neighborhood Terrorist Bombing
Source: The Washington Post
Quotes: Note: Hamza was an 11 year-old Iraqi boy. Khuzai is his father. Wid Hussein is a teenage neighbor of Hamza's and also lost a brother, Mustafa, to the bombing. The bombing occurred as Iraqi children were being given treats from American soldiers.
"We all heard a big boom, and the metal came flying," Khuzai said Monday. "I ran inside the house, saying, 'Where's Hamza?' "
"What happened in England drew condemnation from all the presidents and kings of the world. But when all our children here are gone, not even an Arab leader says a word," Khuzai lamented Monday.
Iraqi children "always surround them, laugh, imitate the way they walk, go like this with them," Khuzai remembered, giving a thumbs-up as he and his family and other mourners gathered in the front room. "Why?" Khuzai said. "They are using the children as shields."
"It wasn't the fault of the Americans," Hamza's father said later, relenting.
"It's their responsibility," said Wid Hussein. "The Americans brought all this tragedy to us."
"Don't say that -- it's not the Americans who are killing. It's the terrorists," Hamza's father answered.
"It's their responsibility," she shot back. "Why did they come here?"
Source: The Washington Post
Quotes: Note: Hamza was an 11 year-old Iraqi boy. Khuzai is his father. Wid Hussein is a teenage neighbor of Hamza's and also lost a brother, Mustafa, to the bombing. The bombing occurred as Iraqi children were being given treats from American soldiers.
"We all heard a big boom, and the metal came flying," Khuzai said Monday. "I ran inside the house, saying, 'Where's Hamza?' "
"What happened in England drew condemnation from all the presidents and kings of the world. But when all our children here are gone, not even an Arab leader says a word," Khuzai lamented Monday.
Iraqi children "always surround them, laugh, imitate the way they walk, go like this with them," Khuzai remembered, giving a thumbs-up as he and his family and other mourners gathered in the front room. "Why?" Khuzai said. "They are using the children as shields."
"It wasn't the fault of the Americans," Hamza's father said later, relenting.
"It's their responsibility," said Wid Hussein. "The Americans brought all this tragedy to us."
"Don't say that -- it's not the Americans who are killing. It's the terrorists," Hamza's father answered.
"It's their responsibility," she shot back. "Why did they come here?"
Wednesday, July 20, 2005
Shiite RhetIraq: al-Sistani and al-Sadr
Who: Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and Shia Leader Muqtada al-Sadr
Source: The Independent UK
Quotes:
About al-Sistani: The slaughter of hundreds of civilians by suicide bombers shows that a "genocidal war" is threatening Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the country's most influential Shia cleric, warned yesterday.
By al-Sadr: "The occupation itself is the problem," he said. "Iraq not being independent is the problem. And the other problems stem from that - from sectarianism to civil war. The entire American presence causes this."
Source: The Independent UK
Quotes:
About al-Sistani: The slaughter of hundreds of civilians by suicide bombers shows that a "genocidal war" is threatening Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the country's most influential Shia cleric, warned yesterday.
By al-Sadr: "The occupation itself is the problem," he said. "Iraq not being independent is the problem. And the other problems stem from that - from sectarianism to civil war. The entire American presence causes this."
Monday, July 18, 2005
Iraqi RhetIraq: Shiite Opinion
Who: Sheikh Jalal al-Din al-Saghir (Shia cleric and member of Iraqi Parliament)
Source: The Times
Quote: “What is truly happening, and what shall happen, is clear: a war against the Shias.”
“I am very keen to preserve the Sunni blood that would be shed due to the irrational acts of some of their leaders, who do not see that they are leading the country into civil war.”
Source: The Times
Quote: “What is truly happening, and what shall happen, is clear: a war against the Shias.”
“I am very keen to preserve the Sunni blood that would be shed due to the irrational acts of some of their leaders, who do not see that they are leading the country into civil war.”
Thursday, July 14, 2005
Iraqi RhetIraq: Defense Minister
Who: Saadoun al-Dulaimi
Source: Washington Post
Quotes:
Defense Minister Sadoun Dulaimi said during a news conference here that the five-point memorandum of understanding that he and Iran's defense minister, Adm. Ali Shamkhani, signed Thursday in Tehran contained "no agreement" on military training.
Asked whether Shamkhani had misrepresented the content of the accord, Dulaimi said only that "he has the right to mention what he wants. We, as Iraqis, are not responsible for that."
"What we lost by war," he said, "we will win by peace and dialogue. We have no option but to live peacefully with each other."
While asserting that training of troops was not covered under the agreement, Dulaimi said it did call for Iran to give $1 billion in reconstruction aid to the Iraqi government, some of which would go to the Defense Ministry. But the Iraqi army was satisfied with the training provided by the U.S. military, he said, and Iraq was dependent on the protection provided by American troops.
Source: Washington Post
Quotes:
Defense Minister Sadoun Dulaimi said during a news conference here that the five-point memorandum of understanding that he and Iran's defense minister, Adm. Ali Shamkhani, signed Thursday in Tehran contained "no agreement" on military training.
Asked whether Shamkhani had misrepresented the content of the accord, Dulaimi said only that "he has the right to mention what he wants. We, as Iraqis, are not responsible for that."
"What we lost by war," he said, "we will win by peace and dialogue. We have no option but to live peacefully with each other."
While asserting that training of troops was not covered under the agreement, Dulaimi said it did call for Iran to give $1 billion in reconstruction aid to the Iraqi government, some of which would go to the Defense Ministry. But the Iraqi army was satisfied with the training provided by the U.S. military, he said, and Iraq was dependent on the protection provided by American troops.
Monday, July 11, 2005
Bush Admin RhetIraq: State Dept.
Who: Tom Casey - acting State Dept. Spokesman
Source: US Dept. of State
Quote: In response to question asked about Iran/Iraqi agreement for Iraqi military training;
"I think in general what I'd just like to say is -- remind you that, you know, as we've said in the past, it's important, we think, for Iraq to have good relations with all its neighbors, including Iran. And we certainly would encourage Iran to play a positive and productive role in helping the Iraqis, as we are trying to do, establish a free democratic system and to build a prosperous and peaceful country."
Comment: Will Iran be removed from the "Axis of Evil" and added to the "Coalition of the Willing"?
Source: US Dept. of State
Quote: In response to question asked about Iran/Iraqi agreement for Iraqi military training;
"I think in general what I'd just like to say is -- remind you that, you know, as we've said in the past, it's important, we think, for Iraq to have good relations with all its neighbors, including Iran. And we certainly would encourage Iran to play a positive and productive role in helping the Iraqis, as we are trying to do, establish a free democratic system and to build a prosperous and peaceful country."
Comment: Will Iran be removed from the "Axis of Evil" and added to the "Coalition of the Willing"?
Iraqi/Iranian RhetIraq: Defence Ministers
Who: Saadoun al-Dulaimi (Iraqi Minister of Defence) and Admiral Ali Shamkhani (Iranian Minister of Defence)
Source: Financial Times UK and Reuters-LA Times
Quotes: From July 8 FT article (July 12 LA Times article added on July 14);
"It's a new chapter in our relations with Iraq. We will start wide defense cooperation," Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani said at a news conference with his visiting Iraqi counterpart, Saadoun Dulaimi.
"We're going to form some committees which will be involved in mine clearance, identifying those missing from the war and also … to help train, rebuild and modernize the Iraqi army."
"Nobody can dictate to Iraq its relations with other countries," Mr. Dulaimi said in a joint press conference with his Iranian counterpart, Admiral Ali Shamkhani.
Mr. Dulaimi said coalition forces were still needed. "If they leave in the current situation, there will be nothing but insurgency and crisis."
Source: Financial Times UK and Reuters-LA Times
Quotes: From July 8 FT article (July 12 LA Times article added on July 14);
"It's a new chapter in our relations with Iraq. We will start wide defense cooperation," Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani said at a news conference with his visiting Iraqi counterpart, Saadoun Dulaimi.
"We're going to form some committees which will be involved in mine clearance, identifying those missing from the war and also … to help train, rebuild and modernize the Iraqi army."
"Nobody can dictate to Iraq its relations with other countries," Mr. Dulaimi said in a joint press conference with his Iranian counterpart, Admiral Ali Shamkhani.
Mr. Dulaimi said coalition forces were still needed. "If they leave in the current situation, there will be nothing but insurgency and crisis."
Sunday, July 10, 2005
Presidential RhetIraq: Iyad Allawi
Who: P.M. Iyad Allawi - former Interim Prime Minister of Iraq
Source: The Times
Quotes:
“The problem is that the Americans have no vision and no clear policy on how to go about in Iraq.”
“The policy should be of building national unity in Iraq. Without this we will most certainly slip into a civil war. We are practically in stage one of a civil war as we speak.”
“I cannot see withdrawal based on timing, but based on conditions,” he said. These would be satisfied only once Iraq “develops the capability to deal with threats”.
Source: The Times
Quotes:
“The problem is that the Americans have no vision and no clear policy on how to go about in Iraq.”
“The policy should be of building national unity in Iraq. Without this we will most certainly slip into a civil war. We are practically in stage one of a civil war as we speak.”
“I cannot see withdrawal based on timing, but based on conditions,” he said. These would be satisfied only once Iraq “develops the capability to deal with threats”.
Saturday, July 09, 2005
Iraqi RhetIraq: Government Spokesman
Who: Laith Kubba
Source: Guardian UK
Quote: Speaking about Thursday's blasts in London that killed more than 50 people, Laith Kubba said "we don't know exactly who carried out these acts but it is clear that these networks used to be in Afghanistan and now they work in Iraq."
Source: Guardian UK
Quote: Speaking about Thursday's blasts in London that killed more than 50 people, Laith Kubba said "we don't know exactly who carried out these acts but it is clear that these networks used to be in Afghanistan and now they work in Iraq."
Sunday, July 03, 2005
Pundit RhetIraq: From the Moderate Left
Who: David S. Broder
Source: The Washington Post
Quote: What serious people are asking of the administration is a set of yardsticks by which the situation in Iraq can be realistically measured -- and accountability established for a strategy to reach those goals. That is something the president has refused to provide, beyond his cliched declaration that "the United States will stay as long as necessary -- and not one day longer."
It is hard to understand his resistance to this perfectly reasonable demand for a set of metrics by which all concerned -- Congress and the administration, service members and their families, and the general public -- could judge what is happening.
Source: The Washington Post
Quote: What serious people are asking of the administration is a set of yardsticks by which the situation in Iraq can be realistically measured -- and accountability established for a strategy to reach those goals. That is something the president has refused to provide, beyond his cliched declaration that "the United States will stay as long as necessary -- and not one day longer."
It is hard to understand his resistance to this perfectly reasonable demand for a set of metrics by which all concerned -- Congress and the administration, service members and their families, and the general public -- could judge what is happening.
Editorial RhetIraq: The Washington Post
Who: The Washington Post
Source: The Washington Post
Quote: IT IS NOT KNOWN, and may never be, what benefit to U.S. security resulted from the reported CIA seizure of a radical Egyptian cleric on a street in Milan in 2003 and his delivery to Cairo for detention in an Egyptian prison. But the price of the extraordinary operation is all too apparent: from the more than $100,000 some 18 operatives allegedly blew on luxury hotels to the kidnapping charges an Italian prosecutor has brought against 13 of them, to the understandable uproar in Italy and the damage it could cause to future Italian-American cooperation in the war on terrorism. Was the sudden disappearance of Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr and any intelligence it yielded -- allegedly under torture so severe that he lost hearing in one ear -- worth it? It's hard to believe so, especially since Italian authorities are telling journalists that the Bush administration had an workable alternative to its lawless behavior: allowing the security services of a close NATO ally to complete their own legal operation against Mr. Nasr and his associates.
Source: The Washington Post
Quote: IT IS NOT KNOWN, and may never be, what benefit to U.S. security resulted from the reported CIA seizure of a radical Egyptian cleric on a street in Milan in 2003 and his delivery to Cairo for detention in an Egyptian prison. But the price of the extraordinary operation is all too apparent: from the more than $100,000 some 18 operatives allegedly blew on luxury hotels to the kidnapping charges an Italian prosecutor has brought against 13 of them, to the understandable uproar in Italy and the damage it could cause to future Italian-American cooperation in the war on terrorism. Was the sudden disappearance of Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr and any intelligence it yielded -- allegedly under torture so severe that he lost hearing in one ear -- worth it? It's hard to believe so, especially since Italian authorities are telling journalists that the Bush administration had an workable alternative to its lawless behavior: allowing the security services of a close NATO ally to complete their own legal operation against Mr. Nasr and his associates.
Pundit RhetIraq: From the Moderate Left
Who: Frank Rich
Source: NY Times
Quote: Iraq may not be Vietnam, but The Wall Street Journal reports that the current war's unpopularity now matches the Gallup findings during the Vietnam tipping point, the summer of 1968. As the prospect of midterm elections pumps more and more genuine fear into the hearts of Republicans up for re-election, it's the Bush presidency, not the insurgency, that will be in its last throes. Is the commander in chief so isolated in his bubble that he does not realize this?
Source: NY Times
Quote: Iraq may not be Vietnam, but The Wall Street Journal reports that the current war's unpopularity now matches the Gallup findings during the Vietnam tipping point, the summer of 1968. As the prospect of midterm elections pumps more and more genuine fear into the hearts of Republicans up for re-election, it's the Bush presidency, not the insurgency, that will be in its last throes. Is the commander in chief so isolated in his bubble that he does not realize this?
Saturday, July 02, 2005
Afghan RhetIraq
Who: Malalai Juya (female candidate in Sept. upcoming elections)
Source: Guardian UK
Quote: "After the presidential elections last year, everyone was optimistic that we were heading toward a stable, peaceful democracy. But it no longer seems that way," "Everyone is scared now. Security has been getting worse and worse by the day."
Source: Guardian UK
Quote: "After the presidential elections last year, everyone was optimistic that we were heading toward a stable, peaceful democracy. But it no longer seems that way," "Everyone is scared now. Security has been getting worse and worse by the day."
