Wednesday, June 22, 2005
Democrat RhetIraq: Sen. Biden
Who: Sen. Joseph Biden (D-Del)
Source: Senator Biden's Congressional Site - Speech @ Brookings: A New Compact for Iraq
Quotes:
There is a credibility gap, a credibility gap that exists between the rhetoric the American people are hearing and the reality of what is happening on the ground. That does not mean the gap cannot be closed, but absent closing that gap, the American people are not, in my view, going to be prepared to give the president the support and time he needs to get it right in Iraq.
First, the insurgency remains as bad as it was a year ago, but more jihadists are coming across the Iraqi border, and they are an increasingly lethal part of the problem.
Insurgent attacks are back up between 60 and 70 per week. Car bombs now average 30 a week, up from just one a week in January of 2004.
In the seven weeks since the Iraqi government has been seated, more than 1,000 people have been killed.
The good news is -- and there is some good news -- but the good news is that some disgruntled Sunnis are finally beginning to make the switch from violence to politics.
The bad news is, a whole lot of them are not.
Our forces go out and clean out towns. But then they move to the next hornet's nest. They lack the resources to lead a strong residual force behind to prevent the insurgents from returning to and intimidating the fence-sitters who are too afraid to take a chance on behalf of the government.
I heard, with every general and every flight officer with whom I spoke about the inability to mount a serious counterinsurgency effort.
Second, Iraqi security forces are very gradually improving. But they are still no match for the insurgents without significant coalition support.
Right now, there are 107 battalions in uniform being trained by us.
Three of those are fully capable. Translated: It means they can do the job without any Americans hanging around with them. They can do the job.
Somewhere around 27 are somewhat capable, meaning they can do the job but backed up by a significant American presence -- backed up by.
The rest are in varying degrees of ability to be able to in any way enhance the security circumstance with American forces.
And I would note parenthetically again, there has been a rapid change since my last trip. Now everybody is essentially sanctified – or sanctified's the wrong word -- maybe for Iraq it's not -- but has essentially acknowledged the permanency, at least in the initial stages, of the Badr Brigade and the peshmerga. Remember, they were going to be integrated into the army, not as units, but on a personal basis.
Fourth, the reconstruction program in Iraq has thus far been a disaster.
Remember the $18.4 billion that Congress appropriated at the urgent request of the president of the United States in the fall of '03, for which I helped floor manage and took on the responsibility, along with others to push hard, because I believe there is a nexus between the reconstruction and the physical safety and possible success of our military in the region.
Just $6 billion of that $18.4 billion has been spent.
And 40 percent of that has been allocated to rebuilding Iraqi security forces because of our lack of truth and advertising in the budget in asking directly for that money for that purpose.
Of the $3.5 billion or so actually spent on reconstruction, between 25 percent and 40 percent of the reconstruction dollars has gone to provide security for those jobs.
We have repeatedly missed the deadlines for increasing power, oil production. As temperatures approach 120 degrees in the third summer since Saddam's statue came down, Iraqis still have only about eight hours a day of electricity and almost half do not have regular access to clean water. And most estimates place unemployment above 40 percent.
Fifth, the Iraqi government has very little capacity and very limited reach beyond the green zone. In the absence of governmental authority, insurgents, foreign fighters, neighbors like Iran and Syria, criminals and other opportunists are filling the breach.
In short, I did not come away with the impression that the insurgency was, as the vice president of the United States suggested, in its last throes.
And unlike the president of the United States, I am not, quote, "pleased with the progress," end of quote, we're making, as I recently saw it and as he recently put it.
The disconnect between the administration's rhetoric and the reality on the ground has opened not just a credibility gap, but a credibility chasm. Standing right in the middle of that chasm are 139,000 American troops, some of them -- some of them -- on their third tour.
This disconnect, I believe, is fueling cynicism that is undermining the single most important weapon we need to give our troops to be able to do their job, and that is the unyielding support of the American people.
But I believe we have a shot, a serious shot, we have still a chance to succeed in Iraq. And I also believe that the future, if it results in failure, will be a disaster.
I want to see the president of the United States succeed in Iraq. It is necessary for the president to succeed in Iraq. His success is America's success, and his failure is America's failure.
And let me state to you what I think the options are. The options are basically four.
First, we can stick with the status quo and try to muddle through. I think that is a prescription for failure. It is not working now and nothing leads me to believe that it can work.
Second, we can call it quits and withdraw. I think that would be a gigantic mistake for the reasons I stated earlier.
Or we can set a deadline for pulling out which I fear will only encourage our enemies to wait us out -- equally a mistake.
Third, we can limit our losses -- which may end up being our only option, if we don't do the right thing in the near term. We may limit our losses by manipulating the emerging balance of power in Iraq and throwing our weight behind the Kurds and the Shia.
I recommended -- not presumptuously, but in response to a question -- I recommended to the administration the president address the nation in prime time on Iraq sooner than later in order to be able to keep the American people in the deal.
I was pleased to learn that the president is planning to speak to the American people on Iraq in the days ahead. I hope he will take the opportunity to level with the American people about what is at stake, what still we have to do to achieve, what is our goal and how we plan to achieve it.
Most importantly, I hope the president will demonstrate that he has heard the concerns of the American people and that he is taking significant steps not to stay the course, but to correct the course.
Tell them [the American public] the truth, tell them what you need, tell them how hard it will be, and they, if they believe you're leveling with them, will give you the resources to have a shot at getting it done.
Fail to do that and they will leave you, not because of the deaths, as tragic as they are, but, in my view, because they will have concluded that there is not a plan, there is not a plan for success.
We also need to make real policy changes on the ground in four key areas: security, governance and politics, reconstruction and burden-sharing.
My conviction, ladies and gentlemen, that we can still succeed in Iraq, is at the heart of my call today for a new compact between the president and Congress to regain the trust of the American people because, mark my words, if we do not regain that trust, it will be virtually impossible to succeed.
It's late in the day, folks, but it's not too late. If the president agrees to this new compact, if he makes important political changes at home as well as the policy on the ground, if he levels with us and presents a clear strategy for Iraq, then I believe the American people will respond and give him the support and the time he needs to prevail.
For I know of no one I've met in the rosiest, rosiest of all projections suggest that any less than a year, any less than a year is needed -- and most of the estimates from very realistic people on the ground is that it will be considerably more than that.
We need the time. We need the American people. We must level with them.
I can't imagine it being less than two years, if all goes well, before we essentially can say we're out of Iraq.
Source: Senator Biden's Congressional Site - Speech @ Brookings: A New Compact for Iraq
Quotes:
There is a credibility gap, a credibility gap that exists between the rhetoric the American people are hearing and the reality of what is happening on the ground. That does not mean the gap cannot be closed, but absent closing that gap, the American people are not, in my view, going to be prepared to give the president the support and time he needs to get it right in Iraq.
First, the insurgency remains as bad as it was a year ago, but more jihadists are coming across the Iraqi border, and they are an increasingly lethal part of the problem.
Insurgent attacks are back up between 60 and 70 per week. Car bombs now average 30 a week, up from just one a week in January of 2004.
In the seven weeks since the Iraqi government has been seated, more than 1,000 people have been killed.
The good news is -- and there is some good news -- but the good news is that some disgruntled Sunnis are finally beginning to make the switch from violence to politics.
The bad news is, a whole lot of them are not.
Our forces go out and clean out towns. But then they move to the next hornet's nest. They lack the resources to lead a strong residual force behind to prevent the insurgents from returning to and intimidating the fence-sitters who are too afraid to take a chance on behalf of the government.
I heard, with every general and every flight officer with whom I spoke about the inability to mount a serious counterinsurgency effort.
Second, Iraqi security forces are very gradually improving. But they are still no match for the insurgents without significant coalition support.
Right now, there are 107 battalions in uniform being trained by us.
Three of those are fully capable. Translated: It means they can do the job without any Americans hanging around with them. They can do the job.
Somewhere around 27 are somewhat capable, meaning they can do the job but backed up by a significant American presence -- backed up by.
The rest are in varying degrees of ability to be able to in any way enhance the security circumstance with American forces.
And I would note parenthetically again, there has been a rapid change since my last trip. Now everybody is essentially sanctified – or sanctified's the wrong word -- maybe for Iraq it's not -- but has essentially acknowledged the permanency, at least in the initial stages, of the Badr Brigade and the peshmerga. Remember, they were going to be integrated into the army, not as units, but on a personal basis.
Fourth, the reconstruction program in Iraq has thus far been a disaster.
Remember the $18.4 billion that Congress appropriated at the urgent request of the president of the United States in the fall of '03, for which I helped floor manage and took on the responsibility, along with others to push hard, because I believe there is a nexus between the reconstruction and the physical safety and possible success of our military in the region.
Just $6 billion of that $18.4 billion has been spent.
And 40 percent of that has been allocated to rebuilding Iraqi security forces because of our lack of truth and advertising in the budget in asking directly for that money for that purpose.
Of the $3.5 billion or so actually spent on reconstruction, between 25 percent and 40 percent of the reconstruction dollars has gone to provide security for those jobs.
We have repeatedly missed the deadlines for increasing power, oil production. As temperatures approach 120 degrees in the third summer since Saddam's statue came down, Iraqis still have only about eight hours a day of electricity and almost half do not have regular access to clean water. And most estimates place unemployment above 40 percent.
Fifth, the Iraqi government has very little capacity and very limited reach beyond the green zone. In the absence of governmental authority, insurgents, foreign fighters, neighbors like Iran and Syria, criminals and other opportunists are filling the breach.
In short, I did not come away with the impression that the insurgency was, as the vice president of the United States suggested, in its last throes.
And unlike the president of the United States, I am not, quote, "pleased with the progress," end of quote, we're making, as I recently saw it and as he recently put it.
The disconnect between the administration's rhetoric and the reality on the ground has opened not just a credibility gap, but a credibility chasm. Standing right in the middle of that chasm are 139,000 American troops, some of them -- some of them -- on their third tour.
This disconnect, I believe, is fueling cynicism that is undermining the single most important weapon we need to give our troops to be able to do their job, and that is the unyielding support of the American people.
But I believe we have a shot, a serious shot, we have still a chance to succeed in Iraq. And I also believe that the future, if it results in failure, will be a disaster.
I want to see the president of the United States succeed in Iraq. It is necessary for the president to succeed in Iraq. His success is America's success, and his failure is America's failure.
And let me state to you what I think the options are. The options are basically four.
First, we can stick with the status quo and try to muddle through. I think that is a prescription for failure. It is not working now and nothing leads me to believe that it can work.
Second, we can call it quits and withdraw. I think that would be a gigantic mistake for the reasons I stated earlier.
Or we can set a deadline for pulling out which I fear will only encourage our enemies to wait us out -- equally a mistake.
Third, we can limit our losses -- which may end up being our only option, if we don't do the right thing in the near term. We may limit our losses by manipulating the emerging balance of power in Iraq and throwing our weight behind the Kurds and the Shia.
I recommended -- not presumptuously, but in response to a question -- I recommended to the administration the president address the nation in prime time on Iraq sooner than later in order to be able to keep the American people in the deal.
I was pleased to learn that the president is planning to speak to the American people on Iraq in the days ahead. I hope he will take the opportunity to level with the American people about what is at stake, what still we have to do to achieve, what is our goal and how we plan to achieve it.
Most importantly, I hope the president will demonstrate that he has heard the concerns of the American people and that he is taking significant steps not to stay the course, but to correct the course.
Tell them [the American public] the truth, tell them what you need, tell them how hard it will be, and they, if they believe you're leveling with them, will give you the resources to have a shot at getting it done.
Fail to do that and they will leave you, not because of the deaths, as tragic as they are, but, in my view, because they will have concluded that there is not a plan, there is not a plan for success.
We also need to make real policy changes on the ground in four key areas: security, governance and politics, reconstruction and burden-sharing.
My conviction, ladies and gentlemen, that we can still succeed in Iraq, is at the heart of my call today for a new compact between the president and Congress to regain the trust of the American people because, mark my words, if we do not regain that trust, it will be virtually impossible to succeed.
It's late in the day, folks, but it's not too late. If the president agrees to this new compact, if he makes important political changes at home as well as the policy on the ground, if he levels with us and presents a clear strategy for Iraq, then I believe the American people will respond and give him the support and the time he needs to prevail.
For I know of no one I've met in the rosiest, rosiest of all projections suggest that any less than a year, any less than a year is needed -- and most of the estimates from very realistic people on the ground is that it will be considerably more than that.
We need the time. We need the American people. We must level with them.
I can't imagine it being less than two years, if all goes well, before we essentially can say we're out of Iraq.
