Sunday, January 29, 2006
Report RhetIraq: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
Who: Stuart W. Bowen Jr, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
Source: The New York Times
Quotes: From article titled, "U.S. Rebuilding in Iraq Found to Fall Short"
Because of unforeseen security costs, haphazard planning and shifting priorities, the American-financed reconstruction program in Iraq will not complete scores of projects that were promised to help rebuild the country, a federal oversight agency reported yesterday.
Only 49 of the 136 projects that were originally pledged to improve Iraq's water and sanitation will be finished, with about 300 of an initial 425 projects to provide electricity, the report says.
The planners of the rebuilding effort did not take into account hundreds of millions of dollars in administrative costs, and mostly did not realize that the United States would have to spend money to keep things like power plants and sewage treatment plants running once they had been built, the report says. That ultimately forced the United States to pare the list of projects to cover such expenses.
The report, by the office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, adds that the overall rebuilding plan was also devised without a clear understanding of the decrepit state of Iraq's infrastructure after decades of war, United Nations-imposed penalties and sheer neglect.
The report says that the authority planners "envisioned a much more permissive security environment," but does not take a stand on whether the possibility of such problems should have been considered. The security problems that developed increased the cost of projects and materials, causing delays, the report says.
But security costs alone do not account for the drop in the number of projects that the United States will be able to finish.
"Other unforeseen problems, such as initial plans that were hurriedly put together with little knowledge of actual conditions at proposed projects sites," as well as the need to continue financing the projects once they are up and running, also played a role, the report says. As a result, some $425 million was shifted to support the operation of the plants and the Iraqis who were expected to carry them out.
Source: The New York Times
Quotes: From article titled, "U.S. Rebuilding in Iraq Found to Fall Short"
Because of unforeseen security costs, haphazard planning and shifting priorities, the American-financed reconstruction program in Iraq will not complete scores of projects that were promised to help rebuild the country, a federal oversight agency reported yesterday.
Only 49 of the 136 projects that were originally pledged to improve Iraq's water and sanitation will be finished, with about 300 of an initial 425 projects to provide electricity, the report says.
The planners of the rebuilding effort did not take into account hundreds of millions of dollars in administrative costs, and mostly did not realize that the United States would have to spend money to keep things like power plants and sewage treatment plants running once they had been built, the report says. That ultimately forced the United States to pare the list of projects to cover such expenses.
The report, by the office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, adds that the overall rebuilding plan was also devised without a clear understanding of the decrepit state of Iraq's infrastructure after decades of war, United Nations-imposed penalties and sheer neglect.
The report says that the authority planners "envisioned a much more permissive security environment," but does not take a stand on whether the possibility of such problems should have been considered. The security problems that developed increased the cost of projects and materials, causing delays, the report says.
But security costs alone do not account for the drop in the number of projects that the United States will be able to finish.
"Other unforeseen problems, such as initial plans that were hurriedly put together with little knowledge of actual conditions at proposed projects sites," as well as the need to continue financing the projects once they are up and running, also played a role, the report says. As a result, some $425 million was shifted to support the operation of the plants and the Iraqis who were expected to carry them out.
