Sunday, November 26, 2006
Australian RhetIraq: Iraq War Planner Reflects on War
Who: Peter Tinley, Retired Major and Second in Command of Australian Special Forces in Iraq
Source: The Australian
Quotes: From article titled, "Iraq a moral blunder, says war hero"
THE former SAS officer who devised and executed the Iraq war plan for Australia's special forces says that the nation's involvement has been a strategic and moral blunder.
Peter Tinley, who was decorated for his military service in Afghanistan and Iraq, has broken ranks to condemn the Howard Government over its handling of the war and has called for an immediate withdrawal of Australian troops.
"This war duped the Australian Defence Force and the Australian people in terms of thinking it was in some way legitimate."
As the lead tactical planner for Australia's special forces in the US in late 2002, Mr Tinley was in a unique position to observe intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program and the coalition's military preparations in the lead-up to the war.
During war planning with US and British special forces at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, in 2002, Mr Tinley says he never saw any hard intelligence that Saddam Hussein's regime possessed weapons of mass destruction.
"When I pressed them (US intelligence) for more specific imagery or information regarding locations or likely locations of WMD they confessed, off the record, that there had not been any tangible sighting of any WMD or WMD enabling equipment for some years," he said.
"It was all shadows and inferenced conversations between Iraqis. There was an overwhelming desire for all of the planning staff to simply believe that the Iraqis had learned how to conceal their WMD assets away from the US (surveillance) assets."
After the initial invasion, the search for WMD became something of a "standing joke" with neither coalition troops nor the Iraq Survey Group turning up anything of consequence.
"The notion that pre-emption is a legitimate strategy in the face of such unconvincing intelligence is a betrayal of the Australian way," he said.
Mr Tinley told The Weekend Australian he was now speaking out having expected people "far more capable and more senior than me" to have expressed serious reservations about Australia's involvement in Iraq.
"During our preparations for this war I remember hearing (ex-defence chief) General Peter Gration's misgivings and assumed he did not possess all the information that our Prime Minister did," he said. "I now reflect on his commentary with a completely different view and am saddened that other prominent people in our society didn't speak louder at the time and aren't continuing to speak out in light of what we now know."
He said the Government had broken a moral contract with its defence force in sending it to an "immoral war".
Mr Tinley said the Howard Government had failed to be honest with Australians about Iraq and "you can't separate the sentiment of the defence force from that of the people".
He advocates an immediate pullout of Australia's 500-strong task force in southern Iraq but accepts that security forces must be kept to guard the embassy in Baghdad. "Our 500 troops are in the south-west of Iraq under British tactical command while our US partners are doing all the heavy lifting in the remainder of the country," he said.
Source: The Australian
Quotes: From article titled, "Iraq a moral blunder, says war hero"
THE former SAS officer who devised and executed the Iraq war plan for Australia's special forces says that the nation's involvement has been a strategic and moral blunder.
Peter Tinley, who was decorated for his military service in Afghanistan and Iraq, has broken ranks to condemn the Howard Government over its handling of the war and has called for an immediate withdrawal of Australian troops.
"This war duped the Australian Defence Force and the Australian people in terms of thinking it was in some way legitimate."
As the lead tactical planner for Australia's special forces in the US in late 2002, Mr Tinley was in a unique position to observe intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program and the coalition's military preparations in the lead-up to the war.
During war planning with US and British special forces at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, in 2002, Mr Tinley says he never saw any hard intelligence that Saddam Hussein's regime possessed weapons of mass destruction.
"When I pressed them (US intelligence) for more specific imagery or information regarding locations or likely locations of WMD they confessed, off the record, that there had not been any tangible sighting of any WMD or WMD enabling equipment for some years," he said.
"It was all shadows and inferenced conversations between Iraqis. There was an overwhelming desire for all of the planning staff to simply believe that the Iraqis had learned how to conceal their WMD assets away from the US (surveillance) assets."
After the initial invasion, the search for WMD became something of a "standing joke" with neither coalition troops nor the Iraq Survey Group turning up anything of consequence.
"The notion that pre-emption is a legitimate strategy in the face of such unconvincing intelligence is a betrayal of the Australian way," he said.
Mr Tinley told The Weekend Australian he was now speaking out having expected people "far more capable and more senior than me" to have expressed serious reservations about Australia's involvement in Iraq.
"During our preparations for this war I remember hearing (ex-defence chief) General Peter Gration's misgivings and assumed he did not possess all the information that our Prime Minister did," he said. "I now reflect on his commentary with a completely different view and am saddened that other prominent people in our society didn't speak louder at the time and aren't continuing to speak out in light of what we now know."
He said the Government had broken a moral contract with its defence force in sending it to an "immoral war".
Mr Tinley said the Howard Government had failed to be honest with Australians about Iraq and "you can't separate the sentiment of the defence force from that of the people".
He advocates an immediate pullout of Australia's 500-strong task force in southern Iraq but accepts that security forces must be kept to guard the embassy in Baghdad. "Our 500 troops are in the south-west of Iraq under British tactical command while our US partners are doing all the heavy lifting in the remainder of the country," he said.
Opinion RhetIraq: Richard Clarke on What's Next in Iraq
Who: Richard A. Clarke, former US Government Intelligence, Counterterrorism & Cyber Security Expert. Served under Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush
Source: San Diego Union-Tribune
Quotes: From opinion article titled, "It's time to admit it's over in Iraq"
Americans tend to think we can achieve almost any goal if we just expend more resources and try a bit harder. That spirit has built the greatest nation in history, but it may be dooming Iraq.
As the head of the British army recently noted, the very presence of large numbers of foreign combat troops is the source of much of the violence and instability. Our efforts, then, are merely postponing the day when Iraqis find their way to something approaching normalcy. Only withdrawal offers a realistic path forward.
Too often in the Iraq debate, we have let intuition, slogans and appealing thoughts cloud logic. Perhaps the most troublesome example is the argument that we must honor the American dead by staying until we can build something worthy of their sacrifice.
Stripped of its emotional tones, this argument is, in economic analysis, an appeal to sunk cost. An MIT professor once promised to fail me if I ever justified actions based on sunk cost – so I learned that what is gone is gone, and what is left we should conserve, cherish and employ wisely.
A similarly illogical argument for staying in Iraq is that chaos would follow any near-term U.S. withdrawal. The flaw lies not in the concept that chaos will happen, but rather in thinking that chaos would only happen if we withdraw in the near-term. Chaos will almost certainly follow any U.S. withdrawal, whether in 2008 or 2012.
Even granting that chaos after a 2008 pullout may be worse than what would follow a 2012 withdrawal, is the difference between those two levels of disaster worth the cost? This cost comes in American dead and wounded, Iraqi dead and wounded, billions of dollars in military expenditures, the continued damage to U.S. influence in the world, and the further strengthening of radical Islamist terrorists everywhere.
Another emotionally charged argument against withdrawal is that al-Qaeda will be emboldened by our departure. But are we to conclude that, if we make a mistake, we should continue to make it lest our enemies gloat? Al-Qaeda is already sufficiently emboldened.
There is also the argument that al-Qaeda would turn Iraq into a terrorist base if we leave. But al-Qaeda has already done that, and we are providing the targets in the shooting gallery.
Advocating a near-term withdrawal of U.S. combat divisions is not the same as the United States foreswearing to act in Iraq in the future. We should declare that we will act, with the Iraqi government or without, to prevent Iraq from becoming a terrorist haven after we depart.
Pursuing the terrorists in Iraq does not require 150,000 troops; it can be done with intelligence capabilities, U.S. Special Forces and air power – much of which can be based in Kuwait. Moreover, the Iraqis themselves may rid the country of al-Qaeda once that becomes their responsibility. Already, Sunni groups opposed to the U.S. presence are taking action against al-Qaeda.
We can pursue our core interests in Iraq – ensuring that the country does not become a terrorist base and that it does not destabilize the rest of the region – without a large occupying force. To do this, we should announce our intention to reduce U.S. forces in Iraq beginning in December and concluding with the withdrawal of all major ground combat units within 18 months; declare that the United States seeks no permanent military bases in Iraq; gain permission from Kuwait to station additional combat units there to create an “over the horizon” capability to deal with terrorists in Iraq; accelerate the training and equipping of the Iraqi army with embedded Special Forces; work with our regional allies to create an enhanced covert action capacity to combat Iraq-based terrorism; speed up U.S. reconstruction efforts; and convene a regional process to guarantee the stability of Iraq, inviting Iran, Syria, Jordan, Turkey and the Gulf countries to join.
Are there problems with this plan? Of course. But our current approach – maintaining that we can fix Iraq if we just try a bit harder – is likely more seriously flawed and more costly than the alternative.
Still, President Bush insists on staying in Iraq, and it is easy to understand why. In “The March of Folly” (Ballantine, 1985), Barbara Tuchman documented repeated instances when leaders persisted in disastrous policies well after they knew that success was no longer an available outcome. They did so because the personal consequences of admitting failure would be very high. So they postponed the disastrous end to their policy adventures, hoping for a deus ex machina or to eventually shift the blame.
There is no need to do that now. Everyone already knows who is to blame. It is time to stop the adventure, lower our sights and focus on America's core interests. And that means withdrawal of major combat units.
Source: San Diego Union-Tribune
Quotes: From opinion article titled, "It's time to admit it's over in Iraq"
Americans tend to think we can achieve almost any goal if we just expend more resources and try a bit harder. That spirit has built the greatest nation in history, but it may be dooming Iraq.
As the head of the British army recently noted, the very presence of large numbers of foreign combat troops is the source of much of the violence and instability. Our efforts, then, are merely postponing the day when Iraqis find their way to something approaching normalcy. Only withdrawal offers a realistic path forward.
Too often in the Iraq debate, we have let intuition, slogans and appealing thoughts cloud logic. Perhaps the most troublesome example is the argument that we must honor the American dead by staying until we can build something worthy of their sacrifice.
Stripped of its emotional tones, this argument is, in economic analysis, an appeal to sunk cost. An MIT professor once promised to fail me if I ever justified actions based on sunk cost – so I learned that what is gone is gone, and what is left we should conserve, cherish and employ wisely.
A similarly illogical argument for staying in Iraq is that chaos would follow any near-term U.S. withdrawal. The flaw lies not in the concept that chaos will happen, but rather in thinking that chaos would only happen if we withdraw in the near-term. Chaos will almost certainly follow any U.S. withdrawal, whether in 2008 or 2012.
Even granting that chaos after a 2008 pullout may be worse than what would follow a 2012 withdrawal, is the difference between those two levels of disaster worth the cost? This cost comes in American dead and wounded, Iraqi dead and wounded, billions of dollars in military expenditures, the continued damage to U.S. influence in the world, and the further strengthening of radical Islamist terrorists everywhere.
Another emotionally charged argument against withdrawal is that al-Qaeda will be emboldened by our departure. But are we to conclude that, if we make a mistake, we should continue to make it lest our enemies gloat? Al-Qaeda is already sufficiently emboldened.
There is also the argument that al-Qaeda would turn Iraq into a terrorist base if we leave. But al-Qaeda has already done that, and we are providing the targets in the shooting gallery.
Advocating a near-term withdrawal of U.S. combat divisions is not the same as the United States foreswearing to act in Iraq in the future. We should declare that we will act, with the Iraqi government or without, to prevent Iraq from becoming a terrorist haven after we depart.
Pursuing the terrorists in Iraq does not require 150,000 troops; it can be done with intelligence capabilities, U.S. Special Forces and air power – much of which can be based in Kuwait. Moreover, the Iraqis themselves may rid the country of al-Qaeda once that becomes their responsibility. Already, Sunni groups opposed to the U.S. presence are taking action against al-Qaeda.
We can pursue our core interests in Iraq – ensuring that the country does not become a terrorist base and that it does not destabilize the rest of the region – without a large occupying force. To do this, we should announce our intention to reduce U.S. forces in Iraq beginning in December and concluding with the withdrawal of all major ground combat units within 18 months; declare that the United States seeks no permanent military bases in Iraq; gain permission from Kuwait to station additional combat units there to create an “over the horizon” capability to deal with terrorists in Iraq; accelerate the training and equipping of the Iraqi army with embedded Special Forces; work with our regional allies to create an enhanced covert action capacity to combat Iraq-based terrorism; speed up U.S. reconstruction efforts; and convene a regional process to guarantee the stability of Iraq, inviting Iran, Syria, Jordan, Turkey and the Gulf countries to join.
Are there problems with this plan? Of course. But our current approach – maintaining that we can fix Iraq if we just try a bit harder – is likely more seriously flawed and more costly than the alternative.
Still, President Bush insists on staying in Iraq, and it is easy to understand why. In “The March of Folly” (Ballantine, 1985), Barbara Tuchman documented repeated instances when leaders persisted in disastrous policies well after they knew that success was no longer an available outcome. They did so because the personal consequences of admitting failure would be very high. So they postponed the disastrous end to their policy adventures, hoping for a deus ex machina or to eventually shift the blame.
There is no need to do that now. Everyone already knows who is to blame. It is time to stop the adventure, lower our sights and focus on America's core interests. And that means withdrawal of major combat units.
Military RhetIraq: Marine Commandant on Marine Readiness
Who: Marine General James Conway, Commandant of US Marine Corps
Source: United Press International
Quotes: From article titled, "Analysis: U.S. Marine Corps may expand"
The new commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps says the 180,000-strong Corps may need to expand its ranks to manage both the war on terror and any new contingencies, if the pace of current operations continues.
Gen. James Conway told reporters at the Pentagon Wednesday -- just eight days after his assumption of command -- that the Marine Corps is so tied up in counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan it cannot train and prepare as it should for conventional warfare.
"We're simply not as capable today as we were in 2001," Conway said.
The high demand for troops in Iraq means Marines are spending seven months in Iraq and just a little over that time back home before their unit deploys again. It is supposed to have 14 months to recover, retrain and spend time with their families -- a one-to-two ratio of deployed time to garrison time.
When garrison time is cut short, the Marine Corps has to give up something -- and that is training for traditional engagements.
"The Marine Corps' forte is combined arms maneuver battalion (operations)," Conway said. "We're not doing that. We're not operating together on that scale (to develop) the capability to deploy and win...like we were previously capable of doing," Conway said.
He said he is particularly concerned that artillerymen are losing their skills because they are being used as security forces or civilian affairs troops in Iraq, and headquarters operations are as prepared to plan and carry out a major contingency operation as they should be.
He also said the corps could surge if necessary for a major new offensive in Iraq -- one of the possibilities to change the downward slide in Iraq -- but not without suffering a degradation in daily operations later. Troops and equipment would fall below their normal pace of operations to recover, both physically and in terms of equipment repair and maintenance.
There are only two ways of remedying the strain on the force, Conway said: reducing the demand on troops or adding numbers to the Marine Corps.
Conway is concerned that the failure to make an ongoing, convincing case for the war will lead to the early withdrawal of troops before the job is done, and Iraq's government is capable of securing the country on its own.
"It's not our chore to win. It's our chore to help the Iraqis win," Conway said. "It is not progress that is happening as rapidly as we would like. It's a long slow process. Unfortunately the time we think it would take... is longer that the timeline we feel our country would support," he said.
Source: United Press International
Quotes: From article titled, "Analysis: U.S. Marine Corps may expand"
The new commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps says the 180,000-strong Corps may need to expand its ranks to manage both the war on terror and any new contingencies, if the pace of current operations continues.
Gen. James Conway told reporters at the Pentagon Wednesday -- just eight days after his assumption of command -- that the Marine Corps is so tied up in counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan it cannot train and prepare as it should for conventional warfare.
"We're simply not as capable today as we were in 2001," Conway said.
The high demand for troops in Iraq means Marines are spending seven months in Iraq and just a little over that time back home before their unit deploys again. It is supposed to have 14 months to recover, retrain and spend time with their families -- a one-to-two ratio of deployed time to garrison time.
When garrison time is cut short, the Marine Corps has to give up something -- and that is training for traditional engagements.
"The Marine Corps' forte is combined arms maneuver battalion (operations)," Conway said. "We're not doing that. We're not operating together on that scale (to develop) the capability to deploy and win...like we were previously capable of doing," Conway said.
He said he is particularly concerned that artillerymen are losing their skills because they are being used as security forces or civilian affairs troops in Iraq, and headquarters operations are as prepared to plan and carry out a major contingency operation as they should be.
He also said the corps could surge if necessary for a major new offensive in Iraq -- one of the possibilities to change the downward slide in Iraq -- but not without suffering a degradation in daily operations later. Troops and equipment would fall below their normal pace of operations to recover, both physically and in terms of equipment repair and maintenance.
There are only two ways of remedying the strain on the force, Conway said: reducing the demand on troops or adding numbers to the Marine Corps.
Conway is concerned that the failure to make an ongoing, convincing case for the war will lead to the early withdrawal of troops before the job is done, and Iraq's government is capable of securing the country on its own.
"It's not our chore to win. It's our chore to help the Iraqis win," Conway said. "It is not progress that is happening as rapidly as we would like. It's a long slow process. Unfortunately the time we think it would take... is longer that the timeline we feel our country would support," he said.
Jordanian RhetIraq: King of Jordan on Situation in Iraq
Who: King Abdullah of Jordan
Source: The Washington Post
Quotes: From article titled, "King of Jordan Speaks Out About Iraqi Situation"
King Abdullah of Jordan, who will host a meeting between President Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki this week, said today that the situation in Iraq is quickly disintegrating and dramatic action is needed before the end of the year to unify the country.
The king also said that no serious progress can be made on Iraq's problems until a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian issues is found.
"We have to make sure that all the parties in Iraq understand the dangers of the ongoing escalation, and I hope that Prime Minister Maliki will have some ideas . . . [on] bringing all the different sects inside of Iraq together," Abdullah told George Stephanopoulos on ABC's "This Week." "And they need to do it now, because, obviously, as we're seeing, things are beginning to spiral out of control."
In what may have been a warning to the Bush administration about waiting too long to hear from a high-ranking, bipartisan panel looking for options on Iraq policy, the king stressed that speed is essential. "I don't think we're in a position where we can come back and revisit the problem in early 2007," he said. "There needs to be a strategy. There needs to be a plan that brings all the parties together, and bring them today and not tomorrow."
The Bush administration has been ramping up its diplomatic efforts on Iraq. Bush will fly to Amman to meet Maliki mid-week after attending a NATO summit in Europe. But Shiite leaders who oppose the U.S. occupation have called for Maliki to boycott the meeting.
When pressed by Stephanopoulos about why the Palestinian issue would affect Iraq policy, the king said, the it "resonates beyond the borders of Iraq, beyond the borders of the Arab and Muslim world. . . . But the emotional impact that the Israeli-Palestinian problem has on the ground can be translated to the insecurity and the frustrations throughout the Middle East and the Arab world. For me, that is the priority."
Source: The Washington Post
Quotes: From article titled, "King of Jordan Speaks Out About Iraqi Situation"
King Abdullah of Jordan, who will host a meeting between President Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki this week, said today that the situation in Iraq is quickly disintegrating and dramatic action is needed before the end of the year to unify the country.
The king also said that no serious progress can be made on Iraq's problems until a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian issues is found.
"We have to make sure that all the parties in Iraq understand the dangers of the ongoing escalation, and I hope that Prime Minister Maliki will have some ideas . . . [on] bringing all the different sects inside of Iraq together," Abdullah told George Stephanopoulos on ABC's "This Week." "And they need to do it now, because, obviously, as we're seeing, things are beginning to spiral out of control."
In what may have been a warning to the Bush administration about waiting too long to hear from a high-ranking, bipartisan panel looking for options on Iraq policy, the king stressed that speed is essential. "I don't think we're in a position where we can come back and revisit the problem in early 2007," he said. "There needs to be a strategy. There needs to be a plan that brings all the parties together, and bring them today and not tomorrow."
The Bush administration has been ramping up its diplomatic efforts on Iraq. Bush will fly to Amman to meet Maliki mid-week after attending a NATO summit in Europe. But Shiite leaders who oppose the U.S. occupation have called for Maliki to boycott the meeting.
When pressed by Stephanopoulos about why the Palestinian issue would affect Iraq policy, the king said, the it "resonates beyond the borders of Iraq, beyond the borders of the Arab and Muslim world. . . . But the emotional impact that the Israeli-Palestinian problem has on the ground can be translated to the insecurity and the frustrations throughout the Middle East and the Arab world. For me, that is the priority."
Opinion RhetIraq: What Next in Iraq? From The New Republic
Source: The New Republic
Quotes: From titles of series of "Iraq: What Next?" issue of articles;
Iraq: What Next? Keep the country whole -- by Reza Aslan
Iraq: What Next? Threaten to leave -- by Peter Beinart
Iraq: What Next? Our hopes for Baghdad don't require U.S. troops -- by Richard A. Clarke
Iraq: What Next? Cut a deal with Sunni insurgents -- by Larry Diamond
Iraq: What Next? Give politics a chance -- by the Editors
Iraq: What Next? Bribe the insurgents -- by Niall Ferguson
Iraq: What Next? Divide the country -- by Peter W. Galbraith
Iraq: What Next? Ally with the Sunnis -- by Josef Joffe
Iraq: What Next? Send more troops -- by Robert Kagan
Iraq: What Next? Why we can't understand our own war -- by Lawrence F. Kaplan
Iraq: What next? Disenfranchise the Sunnis -- by James Kurth
Iraq: What Next? Give Iraqis refuge in the United States -- by George Packer
Iraq: What Next? Ignore James Baker -- by Martin Peretz
Iraq: What Next? Bring the troops home -- by David Rieff
Iraq: What Next? Force everyone to the table -- by Anne-Marie Slaughter
Iraq: What Next? Talk to the people you hate -- by Michael Walzer
Iraq: What Next? Try Anything -- by Leon Wieseltier
Quotes: From titles of series of "Iraq: What Next?" issue of articles;
Iraq: What Next? Keep the country whole -- by Reza Aslan
Iraq: What Next? Threaten to leave -- by Peter Beinart
Iraq: What Next? Our hopes for Baghdad don't require U.S. troops -- by Richard A. Clarke
Iraq: What Next? Cut a deal with Sunni insurgents -- by Larry Diamond
Iraq: What Next? Give politics a chance -- by the Editors
Iraq: What Next? Bribe the insurgents -- by Niall Ferguson
Iraq: What Next? Divide the country -- by Peter W. Galbraith
Iraq: What Next? Ally with the Sunnis -- by Josef Joffe
Iraq: What Next? Send more troops -- by Robert Kagan
Iraq: What Next? Why we can't understand our own war -- by Lawrence F. Kaplan
Iraq: What next? Disenfranchise the Sunnis -- by James Kurth
Iraq: What Next? Give Iraqis refuge in the United States -- by George Packer
Iraq: What Next? Ignore James Baker -- by Martin Peretz
Iraq: What Next? Bring the troops home -- by David Rieff
Iraq: What Next? Force everyone to the table -- by Anne-Marie Slaughter
Iraq: What Next? Talk to the people you hate -- by Michael Walzer
Iraq: What Next? Try Anything -- by Leon Wieseltier
News RhetIraq: Iraqi PM Visits Sadr City
Who: Nuri al-Maliki, Prime Minister of Iraq
Source: Reuters
Quotes: From article titled, "Calls for calm as crowd stones Iraqi PM"
The motorcade of Iraq's prime minister was pelted with stones on Sunday by fellow Shi'ites in a Baghdad slum when he paid respects to some of the 200 who died there last week in the deadliest attack since the U.S. invasion.
The anger in Sadr City, stronghold of the Medhi Army Shi'ite militia, boiled over on the third day of a curfew imposed on the capital by Nuri al-Maliki's U.S-backed national unity coalition as it scrambled desperately to stop popular passions exploding into all-out civil war between Shi'ites and the Sunni minority.
Men and youths [...] jeered and jostled as his armoured convoy edged through the throng away from a mourning ceremony for one of the 202 victims of Thursday's multiple car bomb attack in Sadr City.
Source: Reuters
Quotes: From article titled, "Calls for calm as crowd stones Iraqi PM"
The motorcade of Iraq's prime minister was pelted with stones on Sunday by fellow Shi'ites in a Baghdad slum when he paid respects to some of the 200 who died there last week in the deadliest attack since the U.S. invasion.
The anger in Sadr City, stronghold of the Medhi Army Shi'ite militia, boiled over on the third day of a curfew imposed on the capital by Nuri al-Maliki's U.S-backed national unity coalition as it scrambled desperately to stop popular passions exploding into all-out civil war between Shi'ites and the Sunni minority.
Men and youths [...] jeered and jostled as his armoured convoy edged through the throng away from a mourning ceremony for one of the 202 victims of Thursday's multiple car bomb attack in Sadr City.
Friday, November 24, 2006
Pundit RhetIraq: Scott Ritter on What Needs to be Done in Iraq
Who: Scott Ritter, former Chief UN Weapons Inspector in Iraq (1991-1998)
Source: Alternet
Quotes: From article titled, "Democrats Must Offer A New Blueprint for Iraq"
Anything less than total commitment to a new Iraq policy by the new Democratic majority will represent a betrayal of the hopes of the American people who swept them into Congress.
With the dramatic victory of the Democratic Party in the recent mid-term elections, winning as it did a majority in the House of Representatives and the United States Senate, there appear to be heightened expectations in many corners of the United States that this new Congress will be able to somehow act on the expectations of the American people and help President Bush chart a new policy course in Iraq. The resignation of Donald Rumsfeld, together with the appointment of the former CIA Director Bob Gates, represents a transition from ideology to pragmatism in a Defense Department torn apart by the ongoing debacle in Iraq. Mr. Gates not only represents a break from the Rumsfeldian past, but also brings with him his recent participation in the Iraq Study Group, a bipartisan committee tasked with exploring new policy directions for the United States in Iraq.
The political astuteness of the decision by President Bush to replace Rumsfeld with Gates has escaped notice by many Democrats, who seem inclined simply to gloat over the demise of their archenemy. However, removing Rumsfeld not only eliminated an all-too convenient lightening rod for democratic angst over Bush's Iraq policies, but also, by putting Gates up in his stead, bought the Bush administration much needed political breathing room, as Gate's cannot be held accountable for policy failures he had nothing to do with either formulating or implementing. Indeed, given the fact that the Democrats have as of yet failed to articulate anything that remotely resembles a sound policy option regarding Iraq, instead falling back on the age-old tradition of criticizing without offering a solution of their own, a Gates controlled Defense Department will be almost untouchable from an oversight perspective, especially if Gates chooses to act on any of the policy options the Baker-led Iraq Study Group may recommend to the President.
It is imperative that the Democratic Party stake out a position on Iraq before the Iraq Study Group publicly announces its findings and recommendations.
This would enable the Democrats to enter into their mandated tasks of policy oversight from a position of strength, and not the exceptionally weak position they currently occupy. The American people, in voting in the Democrats, let their frustration over the current policy direction in Iraq manifest itself in real change. Lacking any policy option of their own, the Democratic Party could very well find itself in a position where it will have to accept any policy formulation put forward by the Iraq Study Group simply because it has nothing in its stead to offer. Any opposition to a change in policy direction put forward by the Iraq Study Group, regardless of justification, without a sound alternative to be articulated, will look more like political grandstanding than constitutionally mandated oversight, and will be frowned upon by an American electorate with such high hopes and demands.
What could a Democratic Iraq Strategy look like? Perhaps we should start from a position of what it should not look like. There is much talk about the wisdom of recognizing the inevitable, and accept that post-Saddam Iraq, as had been the case with the former Yugoslavia, is incapable of surviving as a unified nation state, and should be broken down into three basic sub-states, one for the Shi'a Arab majority, one for the Sunni Arab minority, and one for the Kurds. While this simplistic vision has its attractions (indeed, there are a number of esteemed American statesmen, Peter Galbraith, the former US Ambassador to Croatia, among them, who embrace such a concept, especially for the Kurds), it is in fact a plan totally devoid of reality. If the goal of breaking Iraq into three separate components is to reduce the likelihood of civil conflict, the fact is that in doing so the end result will be an environment even more conducive to internal strife that manifests itself violently.
The fact of the matter is that in Iraq today there is no homogeneous Shi'a, Sunni or Kurd community to draw upon in forming these theoretical ethnic/religious sub-states. The only one of the three which comes close to having a singular unifying national vision are the Kurds, and they are fatally split between competing political entities, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Peoples Union of Kurdistan (PUK). As recently as 1997 these two parties were engaged in an all-out civil war of their own, and the truce they have been pressured to consummate in the aftermath of the fall of Saddam is tenuous at best. The growing presence of a third Kurdish entity, the Turkish Kurdish Worker's Party, or PKK, in northern Iraq, brings with it the reality that America's NATO ally, Turkey, will never permit an independent Kurdish state to be carved out of Iraq (something the Turkish military has made quite clear to all parties involved). The fractures between Iraq's Kurds are so great, and their hold on unified governance so fragile, that any pressure brought to bear on the tenuous union between the KDP and PUK would result in its immediate dissolution and return to internecine violence, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani's protestations to the contrary notwithstanding.
The Sunni represent a growing quandary for the United States and the region. Once the bedrock foundation of secular stability in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, the Sunni of Iraq today represent the single greatest threat to Iraqi peace and security, and regional stability, due in part to their near-total disenfranchisement since the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq in March 2003. Where once the Ba'ath Party reigned supreme, the Sunni's of Iraq today find their minority status even further reinforced by the reality that their community has been fractured into numerous entities which increasingly are as much at odds with themselves as they are with the Kurds and Shi'a of Iraq. From this internal discord has grown a vigorous Al-Qaeda-based terror organization.
Initially fostered by secular Sunni seeking to exploit the instability in Iraq brought on by terrorism to undermine the American occupation of Iraq (a tactic which has worked extremely well), the instability fueled by terror also weakened the ability of the secular Sunni to contain the vehemently anti-western Al-Qaeda, who have benefited from their close proximity to Saudi Arabia and the birth place of both Wahabism and Osama Bin Laden. Universal opposition to the American occupation of Iraq, fueled by examples of torture, rape and murder that have emerged as a direct result of this occupation, have provided the Al-Qaeda organization inside Iraq with no shortage of recruits, both foreign and indigenous.
The cornerstone of any American policy in Iraq must be the defeat of this Iraqi Al-Qaeda terror organization. The key to achieving this result is to manufacture a split between any Iraqi Al-Qaeda and their Sunni hosts. As a Sunni-based religious fundamentalist movement, Iraqi Al-Qaeda will never be able to establish itself within the Shi'a majority. The Sunni host is the only chance such an organization has to survive. Therefore, it is essential that the Sunni community of Iraq be brought into any political solution in a manner that addresses their legitimate concerns as well as rewards them for their decision to be a responsible part of a unified post-Saddam Iraq. The Sunni, in exchange for helping bring down Al-Qaeda in Iraq and agreeing to peacefully coexist with their Shi'a and Kurdish neighbors, should be given assurances that they will have a viable place in any future government of Iraq, one inclusive of a share of Iraq's oil wealth.
There are two keys to making this happen. The first requires the United States to help orchestrate a coalition of Iraq's Sunni-dominated neighbors in Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia. These three nations would agree to work with any new Iraqi Government to strangle the financial and personnel support being received from abroad by the Iraqi Al-Qaeda. Saudi Arabia would play a particularly vital role, since it provides host to the very Wahabist influences that serve as the religious and ideological motivators of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.
The role of Syria also cannot be understated. Syria has provided host to the very secular Iraqi Sunnis the United States needs to turn to if a viable solution to the question of peace and stability in Iraq is to be found. Many of these secular Iraqi Sunni's are today engaged in helping foment and support the anti-American insurgency. By seeking Syrian assistance in reaching an accommodation with these forces, the United States can initiate the process of separating Iraqi Al-Qaeda from their Sunni hosts. The secular Sunni can provide an effective bridge into the ranks of the Sunni tribes, where the reign of the local Sheik more than often outweighs the influence of the local Mullah.
Identifying, isolating and eliminating those Sunni religious elements which refuse to work within the framework of a unified Iraqi government operating in a post-US occupation Iraq, and instead choose to side with the forces of Al-Qaeda terror, is a job that only the Sunni themselves can accomplish. The goal of the United States should be to facilitate this as rapidly as possible. That this will require a new policy direction vis-à-vis Syria goes without saying, and needs to be recognized and embraced by those in the Democratic Party seeking an end to the current Iraqi quagmire.
The next key is for a political alliance to be struck between a Sunni alliance of tribal, religious and secular (i.e., former Ba'athist) officials and organizations and the most influential indigenous Shi'a group in Iraq today, the Mahdi Army of the Mokhtar al-Sadr. If the United States wants the future government of Iraq to reflect genuine internal dynamics of that country free from outside influence, then it must seek to empower those elements that are truly reflective of the will of the Iraqi people. Recognition (and active support) of a union that brings together the nationalistic Sunni insurgency (versus Al-Qaeda terrorism) and the nationalistic Mahdi Army is the best way to empower the internal voice of Iraq. A Sunni-Shi'a union of this nature would also enable a strong central government in Baghdad to realistically exist, and exert its influence and control over the Kurds in the north, the pro-Iranian militias of the south, and the anarchy that exists in the Sunni Anbar province of western Iraq.
It also means that the United States must turn its back on the government in helped create. The United States must, in the end, break with its failed policy of attempted imposed democracy, and declare the illegitimate by-product of the union of American neo-conservative militaristic adventure and post-Saddam Iraqi chaos, also known as the Government headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, null and void. This government has no legitimacy, no power, and no chance of success. To continue to hold the future of Iraq hostage to its ineffective and corrupt governance only makes an eventual solution to the quagmire that engulfs Iraq that much more uncertain and difficult to achieve.
The elections of January 2005 which spawned the Maliki government were paid for with the blood and sacrifice of hundreds of American service members, not to mention thousands of Iraqis, and there will be those who will seek to hold on to this vestige of a failed dream if for no other reason than to honor those who gave the ultimate sacrifice in attempting to bring the dream to fruition.
But to grasp at the memory of a noble mission, whether it was in Falluja, Najaf, Samara, Baghdad or anywhere else in Iraq, while the overarching policy position in Iraq has fragmented into a thousand disparate pieces, does nothing to sustain the sacrifice of the fallen. In fact, by maintaining a policy direction that fails to recognize the reality of Iraq for the sole purpose of respecting those who have fallen only ensures that their sacrifice will be stained with the blood of others who will die in support of a dream long since mutated into a nightmare.
The Iraqi experiment in American-imposed democracy has failed. The new mission is, simply put, stability operations.
The government of Nouri al-Maliki represents the antithesis of stability, and therefore must be dissolved so that a new government can rule in its place.
The removal of Nouri al-Maliki can be achieved with little or no problems, if handled properly. First and foremost there must be recognition on the part of Washington, DC that the United States will not have any veto or final say over what form the system of governance that emerges in the post-Maliki period takes. In order to have any legitimacy, the future government of Iraq must be a product of Iraqi politicians, representative of Iraqi goals and objectives. The United States has a critical role to play in facilitating the circumstances under which these interested parties can come together, and later in nurturing and sustaining whatever agreement on governance is reached, but the day of the US pro-Consul is over.
The Sunni-Shi'a alliance would not, and could not, be expected to govern in isolation. The two remaining key political players outside of such an alliance, the pro-Iranian Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, or SCIRI, and the Kurds of northern Iraq, would have to be brought in as well. But any effort to incorporate these two elements into a future government of Iraqi unity must be made in concert with a substantive diplomatic effort on the part of the United States to rein in the outside influence of Iran in the affairs of Iraq on the one hand, and any notions of independence on the part of the Kurds on the other. Both of these objectives can be reached, but will require a major shift in policy direction on the part of the United States.
The most dramatic shift would involve a complete strategic rethinking of America's posture vis-à-vis Iran. As currently structured, the US policy toward Iran is one of increasing confrontation leading to the inevitability of conflict that will, from the standpoint of the United States, result in regime change in Iran. This policy stance is more reflective of an overarching ideologically motivated position that embraces the notion of regional transformation in the Middle East, as opposed to a genuine reaction to any legitimate national security concerns emanating from within Iran. If we are considering a radical restructuring of our failed Iraq policy, then we must recognize the failure of the ideologically motivated policy of regional transformation, inclusive of the notion of regime change, which produced this failure.
Iran is not the problem; America's policy is.
Iran represents the best hope the United States has of creating a viable unified Iraqi government that is capable of instilling peace and stability. And it is in Iran's own interest to promote such a government. The current Iranian support of SCIRI and other pro-Iranian elements inside Iraq is borne from a desire on the part of Iran to ensure that whatever government emerges in Iraq does not embrace policies which create conditions that would put Iraq on course for a repeat of the tensions which led to the bloody Iran-Iraq War of the 1980's. Iran views the American occupation of Iraq as a horrific force of destabilization that threatens Iran and the region, and has reacted accordingly.
If the United States were willing to sit down with the Iranians and enter into negotiations about the future of Iraq, especially if this future was one which included a dramatically reduced presence of the United States in Iraq coupled with a reversal of the US policy of regional transformation in the Middle East inclusive of regime change in Tehran, there is good reason to believe that the Iranians would assist not only in the removal of the Maliki Government in Baghdad, but also in the creation of a new unified Iraqi government where the influence of the pro-Iranian SCIRI was moderated to reflect its actual representative influence inside Iraq.
Iran would also prove to be a very influential player in resolving the Kurdish problem in northern Iraq. There can be no doubt that any hope of a viable unified Iraqi government must incorporate some form of genuine Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq, one that recognizes the unique Kurdish language and culture, but which does not promote the concept of Kurdish independence. Iran, with a large and troublesome Kurdish minority of its own, would be a logical ally in support of any such policy. Any shift in policy by the United States which facilitates the inclusion of Iran as a partner in creating a post-occupation Iraqi government would also enable Iran to work more closely with Turkey in creating a unified front in the face of any notions of Kurdish independence on the part of Iraq's Kurds. Autonomy, not independence, should become the buzz phrase with which all parties address the Kurdish problem in the Middle East.
Both Iran and Turkey should be pressed by the United States not only to support an autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq, but also to permit greater autonomy of their own respective Kurdish populations. This is an important element of any US diplomatic effort in support of a post-occupation Iraq, because there can be no talk of a viable unified Iraq so long as northern Iraq serves as a base of operations for the Turkish PKK Kurdish rebels. A unified Iraq must work with the Turks and the Iranians to eradicate the PKK in northern Iraq. But any effort to liquidate the PKK which is not inclusive of a plan to address the root problems in Turkey (and in Iran) which serve to give legitimacy to movements like the PKK will only serve to prolong the violence in the region, and with it the suffering of the Kurdish people. This is one area in which a full-court diplomatic press by the United States, inclusive of a new policy direction regarding Iran, could pay long-term benefits for all.
Once serious negotiations have been entered into with Iran, Syria, Turkey, Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, as well as the various Iraqi factions of concerns (with an emphasis on creating a viable alliance between Sunni insurgents and the Shi'a Mahdi Army), the United States needs to get down to the brass tacks of leaving Iraq. The first order of business is to establish goal-based decision points that are tied to the withdrawal of forces.
The first of these should be the establishment of a cease-fire agreement between the American occupiers and the Sunni and Shi'a insurgents. Once this cease-fire has been agreed to, the United States would fall back to clearly defined bases within Iraq. These would include a major base in Anbar province (possibly the massive H-2 airbase complex), the Balad Base north of Baghdad, and Baghdad Airport. Lesser presence would be maintained in the so-called "Green Zone" in Baghdad, and in the Kurdish north. American forces would be withdrawn from Mosul, Tikrit, Al-Qaim, and other operating areas, as well as the streets of Baghdad. Operations would be limited to force protection.
The immediate impact of such a posture change would be to dramatically cut the number of troops required to serve in Iraq. The first order of business should be to take advantage of these force reductions by removing from Iraq most if not all of the reserve and National Guard units, eliminating some of the greatest sources of strain on the American public. The return of American reserve and National Guard forces from their deployments in Iraq would result in immediate political dividends for the Democrats, shutting down the highly unpopular 'back door draft' instituted by the Rumsfeld-led Defense Department.
As the new Iraqi government takes shape (through protracted negotiations monitored, but not dominated or directed, by the United States), the United States could then trade US military presence for Iraqi security presence. For instance, as the new government assumes responsibility for security in Baghdad, the United States could start phasing out its presence at Baghdad Airport. As central authority is expanded, American draw down would be increased.
It is important to note that this equation does not include the notion of perfect security as a precondition for American response. The assumption of security responsibility by the Iraqi government is all that is required. It is assumed that there will be residual violence that will possibly increase upon the departure of American forces. This must be viewed as a natural and expected result that will diminish over time. In order for any withdrawal strategy to work, the United States cannot allow its actions to be dictated by those who are strengthened by the friction and instability brought on by the continued presence of American troops in Iraq, namely Al-Qaeda. These elements will seek to bog the American forces down in Iraq by increasing the level of violence.
In the end, the only solution to violence in Iraq that is viable is a solution borne from internal Iraqi forces. Removing American forces from Iraq represents the best means of empowering these internal forces while at the same time weakening the forces of terror, especially Al-Qaeda.
In place of the large American force concentrations inside Iraq, Special Forces forward operating bases would be established in the border areas of Iraq to assume the residual military mission of the United States, namely anti-terrorist operations against Al-Qaeda and security training operations inside Iraq as requested by the new Iraqi government. Each of these new bases would comprise approximately one reinforced Brigade's worth of troops, who would be responsible for force protection (securing the base itself), rapid reaction responsibilities (protecting deployed forces if they get in trouble), air support (fixed-wing and helicopter) and anti-terrorist and training support forces (to hunt down Al-Qaeda operatives inside Iraq, as well as help train indigenous Iraqi forces in border security operations) that would need to be established in Jordan and Kuwait (and in Saudi Arabia, if possible, taking advantage of America's long history of operating out of the Saudi provincial town of Ar' Ar'). A similar force could be temporarily established in northern Iraq, in the Kurdish zone, to help suppress the PKK, with the goal of withdrawing this force once unified control of all Iraqi territory by central authorities has been achieved). Special Forces liaison activities could be established with the Syrians and Iranians to coordinate border security along these nations respective borders with Iraq.
Once these Special Forces bases are established and operating, the United States would begin the rapid drawdown of forces inside Iraq, turning all installations over to Iraqi forces as US attention turned away from internal security operations in Iraq to border security operations in cooperation with Iraqi forces and those of Iraq's neighbors. Border security operations would be focused on isolating anti-government and Al-Qaeda elements remaining inside Iraq, so that they could either be compelled to submit to central authority, or else be destroyed. Active US military operations in Iraq would be limited to anti-terrorist efforts and security training missions, as requested by the Iraqi government. Military presence in Baghdad would be limited to force protection requirements for the "Green Zone," requirements which should be reduced dramatically as stability in Baghdad increases in light of the reduction of friction brought on by increased Shi'a-Sunni cooperation and the reduction of American presence. Eventually, as the situation in Iraq is brought back to a degree of normalcy and the Al-Qaeda presence is eliminated, the American military presence in Jordan and Kuwait could in turn be drawn down, bringing to closure the military phase of America's involvement in a post-occupation Iraq. Diplomatic and economic involvement would continue as dictated by the requirements of US foreign and national security policy.
A policy such as the one outlined here is neither "cut and run," nor is it "stay the course." It is reflective of the legitimate national security concerns of the United States, as well as the reality of the situation we face in the post-Saddam Iraq (and Middle East) of today. Two final thoughts on any plan which seeks to address the current predicament in Iraq. First, the matter of Saddam Hussein. To allow the former dictator of Iraq to be executed by the Maliki Government would be the worst move imaginable if the United States seeks a return to peace and stability in this war-torn nation. Justice has not been served with the trial of Saddam. His execution would only increase the stature of the pro-Iranian Dawa faction that Nouri al-Maliki represents. As the Maliki Government is stood down, so should the period of Kangaroo Courts in Iraq.
The United States, in determining the illegitimacy of the Maliki Government, should take custody of Saddam and turn him over to an international tribunal at the Hague. In doing so, the United States should be willing to accept whatever verdict the Hague lays down, even if it is not one we would desire. Whatever short term discomfort such a move might bring inside Iraq would be off-set by its long-term benefits, especially if, in preparing the new forces in Iraq who will be called upon to govern following the dismissal of the Maliki government are made aware, and can be compelled to concur, with such an action.
For all those who wish to see Saddam hang, I can say only this: explain your blood lust to the parents of the scores of American service members who will die as a direct result of the violence engendered by such an action. Far too many Americans have died because of our decision to invade Iraq and depose Saddam. There is no need to heap additional tragedy on top of this policy failure. The United States, in all fairness, must recuse itself from the process of judging Saddam. Let the international courts determine Saddam's fate.
Lastly, we must recognize the role Israel, and America's support of Israel, plays in any policy decision involving the Middle East. As outlined here, the key to any successful American withdrawal from Iraq rests in America's willingness to initiate a new policy direction regarding Iran and Syria. Such a policy move would be strongly opposed by the current Israeli government, and those forces inside the United States supportive of this Israeli government. America must engage in an internal debate and discussion about the proper policy position we as a nation should take regarding the state of Israel. That Israel is a close friend and ally there can be no doubt. That America should be available to protect the legitimate national security interests of Israel, as compatible with international law, again goes without question. But to allow a situation to exist, as it currently does, where Israel can influence, or in some cases, using lobbyist proxies, dictate a given course of policy direction when such policies are not in the national interest of the United States, is unacceptable.
There is a need today for an American policy shift regarding Iraq that seeks not only to bring peace and stability to Iraq, but also normalize America's relations with the entire Middle East. This policy direction should not, and cannot, involve the abandonment of Israel. However, it must be recognized that such a bold new policy regarding Iraq will not be to the liking of those who currently govern in Israel, and their American friends and allies. There is room for debate and discussion on this issue. Indeed, sound policy cannot be achieved without such a debate taking place. But this debate must be held free of the rancor of past debates of this sort, where irresponsible charges of anti-Semitism were thrown about by those unwilling to permit the discussion of any policy position deemed unacceptable to the political right in Israel, or their American allies in the pro-Israeli lobby.
We must accept as a basic premise to any discussion about American-Israeli relations the notion that there are circumstances involving the Middle East in which American interests and Israeli interests diverge, and that America is right in pursuing policies which are best for the national security of the United States, even if Israel disagrees. Any new course of policy direction in Iraq that embraces a rapprochement with Iran and Syria represents a situation in which the possibility of a break with Israel exists. America must have the moral and intellectual courage to accept such a break, because at the end of the day it is what is in the best interests of this country that matters most. Peace in Iraq, and stability in the Middle East is a cause worth embracing, and fighting for, regardless of who might oppose it.
This is a tall order for a new Congress to consider. But anything less than total commitment to all facets of a new Iraq policy, inclusive of those elements that might be uncomfortable for Israel, will represent a betrayal of the hopes of the American people when they voted for a Democratic Congress. The new Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, together with the new Senate Majority Leader, Harry Reid, as well as the rest of the Democratic Party leadership and establishment, should proceed with extreme caution in failing to heed these hopes. The "Big Election," the race for national leadership in November 2008, is just around the corner, and if the November 2006 elections prove anything, a slighted electorate has no patience for those politicians who had slighted them.
Source: Alternet
Quotes: From article titled, "Democrats Must Offer A New Blueprint for Iraq"
Anything less than total commitment to a new Iraq policy by the new Democratic majority will represent a betrayal of the hopes of the American people who swept them into Congress.
With the dramatic victory of the Democratic Party in the recent mid-term elections, winning as it did a majority in the House of Representatives and the United States Senate, there appear to be heightened expectations in many corners of the United States that this new Congress will be able to somehow act on the expectations of the American people and help President Bush chart a new policy course in Iraq. The resignation of Donald Rumsfeld, together with the appointment of the former CIA Director Bob Gates, represents a transition from ideology to pragmatism in a Defense Department torn apart by the ongoing debacle in Iraq. Mr. Gates not only represents a break from the Rumsfeldian past, but also brings with him his recent participation in the Iraq Study Group, a bipartisan committee tasked with exploring new policy directions for the United States in Iraq.
The political astuteness of the decision by President Bush to replace Rumsfeld with Gates has escaped notice by many Democrats, who seem inclined simply to gloat over the demise of their archenemy. However, removing Rumsfeld not only eliminated an all-too convenient lightening rod for democratic angst over Bush's Iraq policies, but also, by putting Gates up in his stead, bought the Bush administration much needed political breathing room, as Gate's cannot be held accountable for policy failures he had nothing to do with either formulating or implementing. Indeed, given the fact that the Democrats have as of yet failed to articulate anything that remotely resembles a sound policy option regarding Iraq, instead falling back on the age-old tradition of criticizing without offering a solution of their own, a Gates controlled Defense Department will be almost untouchable from an oversight perspective, especially if Gates chooses to act on any of the policy options the Baker-led Iraq Study Group may recommend to the President.
It is imperative that the Democratic Party stake out a position on Iraq before the Iraq Study Group publicly announces its findings and recommendations.
This would enable the Democrats to enter into their mandated tasks of policy oversight from a position of strength, and not the exceptionally weak position they currently occupy. The American people, in voting in the Democrats, let their frustration over the current policy direction in Iraq manifest itself in real change. Lacking any policy option of their own, the Democratic Party could very well find itself in a position where it will have to accept any policy formulation put forward by the Iraq Study Group simply because it has nothing in its stead to offer. Any opposition to a change in policy direction put forward by the Iraq Study Group, regardless of justification, without a sound alternative to be articulated, will look more like political grandstanding than constitutionally mandated oversight, and will be frowned upon by an American electorate with such high hopes and demands.
What could a Democratic Iraq Strategy look like? Perhaps we should start from a position of what it should not look like. There is much talk about the wisdom of recognizing the inevitable, and accept that post-Saddam Iraq, as had been the case with the former Yugoslavia, is incapable of surviving as a unified nation state, and should be broken down into three basic sub-states, one for the Shi'a Arab majority, one for the Sunni Arab minority, and one for the Kurds. While this simplistic vision has its attractions (indeed, there are a number of esteemed American statesmen, Peter Galbraith, the former US Ambassador to Croatia, among them, who embrace such a concept, especially for the Kurds), it is in fact a plan totally devoid of reality. If the goal of breaking Iraq into three separate components is to reduce the likelihood of civil conflict, the fact is that in doing so the end result will be an environment even more conducive to internal strife that manifests itself violently.
The fact of the matter is that in Iraq today there is no homogeneous Shi'a, Sunni or Kurd community to draw upon in forming these theoretical ethnic/religious sub-states. The only one of the three which comes close to having a singular unifying national vision are the Kurds, and they are fatally split between competing political entities, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Peoples Union of Kurdistan (PUK). As recently as 1997 these two parties were engaged in an all-out civil war of their own, and the truce they have been pressured to consummate in the aftermath of the fall of Saddam is tenuous at best. The growing presence of a third Kurdish entity, the Turkish Kurdish Worker's Party, or PKK, in northern Iraq, brings with it the reality that America's NATO ally, Turkey, will never permit an independent Kurdish state to be carved out of Iraq (something the Turkish military has made quite clear to all parties involved). The fractures between Iraq's Kurds are so great, and their hold on unified governance so fragile, that any pressure brought to bear on the tenuous union between the KDP and PUK would result in its immediate dissolution and return to internecine violence, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani's protestations to the contrary notwithstanding.
The Sunni represent a growing quandary for the United States and the region. Once the bedrock foundation of secular stability in Iraq under Saddam Hussein, the Sunni of Iraq today represent the single greatest threat to Iraqi peace and security, and regional stability, due in part to their near-total disenfranchisement since the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq in March 2003. Where once the Ba'ath Party reigned supreme, the Sunni's of Iraq today find their minority status even further reinforced by the reality that their community has been fractured into numerous entities which increasingly are as much at odds with themselves as they are with the Kurds and Shi'a of Iraq. From this internal discord has grown a vigorous Al-Qaeda-based terror organization.
Initially fostered by secular Sunni seeking to exploit the instability in Iraq brought on by terrorism to undermine the American occupation of Iraq (a tactic which has worked extremely well), the instability fueled by terror also weakened the ability of the secular Sunni to contain the vehemently anti-western Al-Qaeda, who have benefited from their close proximity to Saudi Arabia and the birth place of both Wahabism and Osama Bin Laden. Universal opposition to the American occupation of Iraq, fueled by examples of torture, rape and murder that have emerged as a direct result of this occupation, have provided the Al-Qaeda organization inside Iraq with no shortage of recruits, both foreign and indigenous.
The cornerstone of any American policy in Iraq must be the defeat of this Iraqi Al-Qaeda terror organization. The key to achieving this result is to manufacture a split between any Iraqi Al-Qaeda and their Sunni hosts. As a Sunni-based religious fundamentalist movement, Iraqi Al-Qaeda will never be able to establish itself within the Shi'a majority. The Sunni host is the only chance such an organization has to survive. Therefore, it is essential that the Sunni community of Iraq be brought into any political solution in a manner that addresses their legitimate concerns as well as rewards them for their decision to be a responsible part of a unified post-Saddam Iraq. The Sunni, in exchange for helping bring down Al-Qaeda in Iraq and agreeing to peacefully coexist with their Shi'a and Kurdish neighbors, should be given assurances that they will have a viable place in any future government of Iraq, one inclusive of a share of Iraq's oil wealth.
There are two keys to making this happen. The first requires the United States to help orchestrate a coalition of Iraq's Sunni-dominated neighbors in Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia. These three nations would agree to work with any new Iraqi Government to strangle the financial and personnel support being received from abroad by the Iraqi Al-Qaeda. Saudi Arabia would play a particularly vital role, since it provides host to the very Wahabist influences that serve as the religious and ideological motivators of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.
The role of Syria also cannot be understated. Syria has provided host to the very secular Iraqi Sunnis the United States needs to turn to if a viable solution to the question of peace and stability in Iraq is to be found. Many of these secular Iraqi Sunni's are today engaged in helping foment and support the anti-American insurgency. By seeking Syrian assistance in reaching an accommodation with these forces, the United States can initiate the process of separating Iraqi Al-Qaeda from their Sunni hosts. The secular Sunni can provide an effective bridge into the ranks of the Sunni tribes, where the reign of the local Sheik more than often outweighs the influence of the local Mullah.
Identifying, isolating and eliminating those Sunni religious elements which refuse to work within the framework of a unified Iraqi government operating in a post-US occupation Iraq, and instead choose to side with the forces of Al-Qaeda terror, is a job that only the Sunni themselves can accomplish. The goal of the United States should be to facilitate this as rapidly as possible. That this will require a new policy direction vis-à-vis Syria goes without saying, and needs to be recognized and embraced by those in the Democratic Party seeking an end to the current Iraqi quagmire.
The next key is for a political alliance to be struck between a Sunni alliance of tribal, religious and secular (i.e., former Ba'athist) officials and organizations and the most influential indigenous Shi'a group in Iraq today, the Mahdi Army of the Mokhtar al-Sadr. If the United States wants the future government of Iraq to reflect genuine internal dynamics of that country free from outside influence, then it must seek to empower those elements that are truly reflective of the will of the Iraqi people. Recognition (and active support) of a union that brings together the nationalistic Sunni insurgency (versus Al-Qaeda terrorism) and the nationalistic Mahdi Army is the best way to empower the internal voice of Iraq. A Sunni-Shi'a union of this nature would also enable a strong central government in Baghdad to realistically exist, and exert its influence and control over the Kurds in the north, the pro-Iranian militias of the south, and the anarchy that exists in the Sunni Anbar province of western Iraq.
It also means that the United States must turn its back on the government in helped create. The United States must, in the end, break with its failed policy of attempted imposed democracy, and declare the illegitimate by-product of the union of American neo-conservative militaristic adventure and post-Saddam Iraqi chaos, also known as the Government headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, null and void. This government has no legitimacy, no power, and no chance of success. To continue to hold the future of Iraq hostage to its ineffective and corrupt governance only makes an eventual solution to the quagmire that engulfs Iraq that much more uncertain and difficult to achieve.
The elections of January 2005 which spawned the Maliki government were paid for with the blood and sacrifice of hundreds of American service members, not to mention thousands of Iraqis, and there will be those who will seek to hold on to this vestige of a failed dream if for no other reason than to honor those who gave the ultimate sacrifice in attempting to bring the dream to fruition.
But to grasp at the memory of a noble mission, whether it was in Falluja, Najaf, Samara, Baghdad or anywhere else in Iraq, while the overarching policy position in Iraq has fragmented into a thousand disparate pieces, does nothing to sustain the sacrifice of the fallen. In fact, by maintaining a policy direction that fails to recognize the reality of Iraq for the sole purpose of respecting those who have fallen only ensures that their sacrifice will be stained with the blood of others who will die in support of a dream long since mutated into a nightmare.
The Iraqi experiment in American-imposed democracy has failed. The new mission is, simply put, stability operations.
The government of Nouri al-Maliki represents the antithesis of stability, and therefore must be dissolved so that a new government can rule in its place.
The removal of Nouri al-Maliki can be achieved with little or no problems, if handled properly. First and foremost there must be recognition on the part of Washington, DC that the United States will not have any veto or final say over what form the system of governance that emerges in the post-Maliki period takes. In order to have any legitimacy, the future government of Iraq must be a product of Iraqi politicians, representative of Iraqi goals and objectives. The United States has a critical role to play in facilitating the circumstances under which these interested parties can come together, and later in nurturing and sustaining whatever agreement on governance is reached, but the day of the US pro-Consul is over.
The Sunni-Shi'a alliance would not, and could not, be expected to govern in isolation. The two remaining key political players outside of such an alliance, the pro-Iranian Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, or SCIRI, and the Kurds of northern Iraq, would have to be brought in as well. But any effort to incorporate these two elements into a future government of Iraqi unity must be made in concert with a substantive diplomatic effort on the part of the United States to rein in the outside influence of Iran in the affairs of Iraq on the one hand, and any notions of independence on the part of the Kurds on the other. Both of these objectives can be reached, but will require a major shift in policy direction on the part of the United States.
The most dramatic shift would involve a complete strategic rethinking of America's posture vis-à-vis Iran. As currently structured, the US policy toward Iran is one of increasing confrontation leading to the inevitability of conflict that will, from the standpoint of the United States, result in regime change in Iran. This policy stance is more reflective of an overarching ideologically motivated position that embraces the notion of regional transformation in the Middle East, as opposed to a genuine reaction to any legitimate national security concerns emanating from within Iran. If we are considering a radical restructuring of our failed Iraq policy, then we must recognize the failure of the ideologically motivated policy of regional transformation, inclusive of the notion of regime change, which produced this failure.
Iran is not the problem; America's policy is.
Iran represents the best hope the United States has of creating a viable unified Iraqi government that is capable of instilling peace and stability. And it is in Iran's own interest to promote such a government. The current Iranian support of SCIRI and other pro-Iranian elements inside Iraq is borne from a desire on the part of Iran to ensure that whatever government emerges in Iraq does not embrace policies which create conditions that would put Iraq on course for a repeat of the tensions which led to the bloody Iran-Iraq War of the 1980's. Iran views the American occupation of Iraq as a horrific force of destabilization that threatens Iran and the region, and has reacted accordingly.
If the United States were willing to sit down with the Iranians and enter into negotiations about the future of Iraq, especially if this future was one which included a dramatically reduced presence of the United States in Iraq coupled with a reversal of the US policy of regional transformation in the Middle East inclusive of regime change in Tehran, there is good reason to believe that the Iranians would assist not only in the removal of the Maliki Government in Baghdad, but also in the creation of a new unified Iraqi government where the influence of the pro-Iranian SCIRI was moderated to reflect its actual representative influence inside Iraq.
Iran would also prove to be a very influential player in resolving the Kurdish problem in northern Iraq. There can be no doubt that any hope of a viable unified Iraqi government must incorporate some form of genuine Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq, one that recognizes the unique Kurdish language and culture, but which does not promote the concept of Kurdish independence. Iran, with a large and troublesome Kurdish minority of its own, would be a logical ally in support of any such policy. Any shift in policy by the United States which facilitates the inclusion of Iran as a partner in creating a post-occupation Iraqi government would also enable Iran to work more closely with Turkey in creating a unified front in the face of any notions of Kurdish independence on the part of Iraq's Kurds. Autonomy, not independence, should become the buzz phrase with which all parties address the Kurdish problem in the Middle East.
Both Iran and Turkey should be pressed by the United States not only to support an autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq, but also to permit greater autonomy of their own respective Kurdish populations. This is an important element of any US diplomatic effort in support of a post-occupation Iraq, because there can be no talk of a viable unified Iraq so long as northern Iraq serves as a base of operations for the Turkish PKK Kurdish rebels. A unified Iraq must work with the Turks and the Iranians to eradicate the PKK in northern Iraq. But any effort to liquidate the PKK which is not inclusive of a plan to address the root problems in Turkey (and in Iran) which serve to give legitimacy to movements like the PKK will only serve to prolong the violence in the region, and with it the suffering of the Kurdish people. This is one area in which a full-court diplomatic press by the United States, inclusive of a new policy direction regarding Iran, could pay long-term benefits for all.
Once serious negotiations have been entered into with Iran, Syria, Turkey, Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, as well as the various Iraqi factions of concerns (with an emphasis on creating a viable alliance between Sunni insurgents and the Shi'a Mahdi Army), the United States needs to get down to the brass tacks of leaving Iraq. The first order of business is to establish goal-based decision points that are tied to the withdrawal of forces.
The first of these should be the establishment of a cease-fire agreement between the American occupiers and the Sunni and Shi'a insurgents. Once this cease-fire has been agreed to, the United States would fall back to clearly defined bases within Iraq. These would include a major base in Anbar province (possibly the massive H-2 airbase complex), the Balad Base north of Baghdad, and Baghdad Airport. Lesser presence would be maintained in the so-called "Green Zone" in Baghdad, and in the Kurdish north. American forces would be withdrawn from Mosul, Tikrit, Al-Qaim, and other operating areas, as well as the streets of Baghdad. Operations would be limited to force protection.
The immediate impact of such a posture change would be to dramatically cut the number of troops required to serve in Iraq. The first order of business should be to take advantage of these force reductions by removing from Iraq most if not all of the reserve and National Guard units, eliminating some of the greatest sources of strain on the American public. The return of American reserve and National Guard forces from their deployments in Iraq would result in immediate political dividends for the Democrats, shutting down the highly unpopular 'back door draft' instituted by the Rumsfeld-led Defense Department.
As the new Iraqi government takes shape (through protracted negotiations monitored, but not dominated or directed, by the United States), the United States could then trade US military presence for Iraqi security presence. For instance, as the new government assumes responsibility for security in Baghdad, the United States could start phasing out its presence at Baghdad Airport. As central authority is expanded, American draw down would be increased.
It is important to note that this equation does not include the notion of perfect security as a precondition for American response. The assumption of security responsibility by the Iraqi government is all that is required. It is assumed that there will be residual violence that will possibly increase upon the departure of American forces. This must be viewed as a natural and expected result that will diminish over time. In order for any withdrawal strategy to work, the United States cannot allow its actions to be dictated by those who are strengthened by the friction and instability brought on by the continued presence of American troops in Iraq, namely Al-Qaeda. These elements will seek to bog the American forces down in Iraq by increasing the level of violence.
In the end, the only solution to violence in Iraq that is viable is a solution borne from internal Iraqi forces. Removing American forces from Iraq represents the best means of empowering these internal forces while at the same time weakening the forces of terror, especially Al-Qaeda.
In place of the large American force concentrations inside Iraq, Special Forces forward operating bases would be established in the border areas of Iraq to assume the residual military mission of the United States, namely anti-terrorist operations against Al-Qaeda and security training operations inside Iraq as requested by the new Iraqi government. Each of these new bases would comprise approximately one reinforced Brigade's worth of troops, who would be responsible for force protection (securing the base itself), rapid reaction responsibilities (protecting deployed forces if they get in trouble), air support (fixed-wing and helicopter) and anti-terrorist and training support forces (to hunt down Al-Qaeda operatives inside Iraq, as well as help train indigenous Iraqi forces in border security operations) that would need to be established in Jordan and Kuwait (and in Saudi Arabia, if possible, taking advantage of America's long history of operating out of the Saudi provincial town of Ar' Ar'). A similar force could be temporarily established in northern Iraq, in the Kurdish zone, to help suppress the PKK, with the goal of withdrawing this force once unified control of all Iraqi territory by central authorities has been achieved). Special Forces liaison activities could be established with the Syrians and Iranians to coordinate border security along these nations respective borders with Iraq.
Once these Special Forces bases are established and operating, the United States would begin the rapid drawdown of forces inside Iraq, turning all installations over to Iraqi forces as US attention turned away from internal security operations in Iraq to border security operations in cooperation with Iraqi forces and those of Iraq's neighbors. Border security operations would be focused on isolating anti-government and Al-Qaeda elements remaining inside Iraq, so that they could either be compelled to submit to central authority, or else be destroyed. Active US military operations in Iraq would be limited to anti-terrorist efforts and security training missions, as requested by the Iraqi government. Military presence in Baghdad would be limited to force protection requirements for the "Green Zone," requirements which should be reduced dramatically as stability in Baghdad increases in light of the reduction of friction brought on by increased Shi'a-Sunni cooperation and the reduction of American presence. Eventually, as the situation in Iraq is brought back to a degree of normalcy and the Al-Qaeda presence is eliminated, the American military presence in Jordan and Kuwait could in turn be drawn down, bringing to closure the military phase of America's involvement in a post-occupation Iraq. Diplomatic and economic involvement would continue as dictated by the requirements of US foreign and national security policy.
A policy such as the one outlined here is neither "cut and run," nor is it "stay the course." It is reflective of the legitimate national security concerns of the United States, as well as the reality of the situation we face in the post-Saddam Iraq (and Middle East) of today. Two final thoughts on any plan which seeks to address the current predicament in Iraq. First, the matter of Saddam Hussein. To allow the former dictator of Iraq to be executed by the Maliki Government would be the worst move imaginable if the United States seeks a return to peace and stability in this war-torn nation. Justice has not been served with the trial of Saddam. His execution would only increase the stature of the pro-Iranian Dawa faction that Nouri al-Maliki represents. As the Maliki Government is stood down, so should the period of Kangaroo Courts in Iraq.
The United States, in determining the illegitimacy of the Maliki Government, should take custody of Saddam and turn him over to an international tribunal at the Hague. In doing so, the United States should be willing to accept whatever verdict the Hague lays down, even if it is not one we would desire. Whatever short term discomfort such a move might bring inside Iraq would be off-set by its long-term benefits, especially if, in preparing the new forces in Iraq who will be called upon to govern following the dismissal of the Maliki government are made aware, and can be compelled to concur, with such an action.
For all those who wish to see Saddam hang, I can say only this: explain your blood lust to the parents of the scores of American service members who will die as a direct result of the violence engendered by such an action. Far too many Americans have died because of our decision to invade Iraq and depose Saddam. There is no need to heap additional tragedy on top of this policy failure. The United States, in all fairness, must recuse itself from the process of judging Saddam. Let the international courts determine Saddam's fate.
Lastly, we must recognize the role Israel, and America's support of Israel, plays in any policy decision involving the Middle East. As outlined here, the key to any successful American withdrawal from Iraq rests in America's willingness to initiate a new policy direction regarding Iran and Syria. Such a policy move would be strongly opposed by the current Israeli government, and those forces inside the United States supportive of this Israeli government. America must engage in an internal debate and discussion about the proper policy position we as a nation should take regarding the state of Israel. That Israel is a close friend and ally there can be no doubt. That America should be available to protect the legitimate national security interests of Israel, as compatible with international law, again goes without question. But to allow a situation to exist, as it currently does, where Israel can influence, or in some cases, using lobbyist proxies, dictate a given course of policy direction when such policies are not in the national interest of the United States, is unacceptable.
There is a need today for an American policy shift regarding Iraq that seeks not only to bring peace and stability to Iraq, but also normalize America's relations with the entire Middle East. This policy direction should not, and cannot, involve the abandonment of Israel. However, it must be recognized that such a bold new policy regarding Iraq will not be to the liking of those who currently govern in Israel, and their American friends and allies. There is room for debate and discussion on this issue. Indeed, sound policy cannot be achieved without such a debate taking place. But this debate must be held free of the rancor of past debates of this sort, where irresponsible charges of anti-Semitism were thrown about by those unwilling to permit the discussion of any policy position deemed unacceptable to the political right in Israel, or their American allies in the pro-Israeli lobby.
We must accept as a basic premise to any discussion about American-Israeli relations the notion that there are circumstances involving the Middle East in which American interests and Israeli interests diverge, and that America is right in pursuing policies which are best for the national security of the United States, even if Israel disagrees. Any new course of policy direction in Iraq that embraces a rapprochement with Iran and Syria represents a situation in which the possibility of a break with Israel exists. America must have the moral and intellectual courage to accept such a break, because at the end of the day it is what is in the best interests of this country that matters most. Peace in Iraq, and stability in the Middle East is a cause worth embracing, and fighting for, regardless of who might oppose it.
This is a tall order for a new Congress to consider. But anything less than total commitment to all facets of a new Iraq policy, inclusive of those elements that might be uncomfortable for Israel, will represent a betrayal of the hopes of the American people when they voted for a Democratic Congress. The new Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, together with the new Senate Majority Leader, Harry Reid, as well as the rest of the Democratic Party leadership and establishment, should proceed with extreme caution in failing to heed these hopes. The "Big Election," the race for national leadership in November 2008, is just around the corner, and if the November 2006 elections prove anything, a slighted electorate has no patience for those politicians who had slighted them.
Wednesday, November 22, 2006
Poll RhetIraq: Iraqi Opinion
Source: World Public Opinion
Quotes: From synopsis titled, "Baghdad Shias Believe Killings May Increase Once U.S.-led Forces Depart but Large Majorities Still Support Withdrawal Within a Year"
[Blogger's Note: The full report can be viewed here.]
Most Shia Arabs living in Baghdad have shifted in recent months from preferring the open-ended deployment of foreign troops in Iraq to wanting a one-year timetable for withdrawal. Nonetheless, a growing majority of Shias in the conflict-ridden capital say that if U.S.-led forces leave within six months there could be an upsurge in inter-ethnic violence.
Eight out of ten Shias in Baghdad (80%) say they want foreign forces to leave within a year (72% of Shias in the rest of the country), according to a poll conducted by World Public Opinion in September. None of the Shias polled in Baghdad want U.S.-led troops to be reduced only “as the security situation improves,” a sharp decline from January, when 57 percent of the Shias polled by WPO in the capital city preferred an open-ended U.S presence.
Seven out of ten Iraqis overall—including both the Shia majority (74%) and the Sunni minority (91%)—say they want the United States to leave within a year.
Nonetheless, the number of Shias in Baghdad who fear an upsurge in violence if U.S. troops withdraw within too short a time span has risen a dramatic 52 points since the beginning of the year. Six out of ten Shias in Iraq’s capital city (59%) believe that sect-on-sect killings would rise in the event of a speedy U.S. withdrawal. This view contrasts with that of Shias in the rest of Iraq, where a majority (64%) thinks such violence would decline if U.S. troops departed in six months.
Outside of Baghdad, majorities of Shias and Sunnis have been consistently optimistic about the consequences of a U.S. withdrawal. In January, 56 percent of Shias said inter-ethnic violence would decrease (37% increase) if the U.S.-led forces pulled out while in September, 64 percent said it would decline (29% increase). Among Sunni Arabs, majorities in September (72%) and January (81%) said interethnic violence would decrease if U.S. troops withdrew in six months.
Fewer than one in ten Iraqis (9%) believe foreign forces should only be reduced “as the security situation improves,” a drop of 20 points since January. Support for this option has fallen especially steeply among Shias (from 29% to 5%) and Kurds (57% to 31%).
Nearly all Sunnis also oppose the indefinite presence of foreign forces (2% in favor). But while a majority of Sunnis (57%) still prefer that U.S.-led troops leave within six months, that percentage has declined 26 points since January when 83 percent wanted foreign forces out within half a year.
The number of Shias in the capital city and elsewhere who think Iraq is headed in the right direction has dropped considerably since the beginning of 2006. In January, nine out of ten Shias in Baghdad (88%) thought Iraq was on the right path. By September, three quarters (74%) did. Outside of Baghdad, the declining optimism among Shias has been even steeper. Eight-two percent thought Iraq was headed in the right direction in January while about half (52%) thought so by September.
Seven in ten Shias in Baghdad (71%) say Iraqi forces will be strong enough within six months to take over the country’s security should foreign troops withdraw. That’s an increase of 30 percent from January, when only 41 percent thought that Iraqis would be able to take on the country’s security challenges within six months. There is little difference of opinion on this between Shias in Baghdad (71%) and those elsewhere (66%).
All Shias polled in Baghdad (100%) believe that the U.S. military presence is “provoking more conflict than it is preventing.” Outside of Baghdad, this view is slightly less common: 74 percent of Shias in the rest of the country say the presence of U.S. troops provokes conflict while 25 percent say the troops are a stabilizing force.
At the same time, the number of Shias who approve of attacks on U.S.-led forces has jumped 24 points. In January, about a third of Shias (36%) polled in Baghdad expressed approval of such assaults. By September, the proportion of Shias in Baghdad saying they approved of striking American-led forces had risen to 60 percent. In the rest of the country, Shia support for attacking foreign troops rose 20 points, from 43 percent to 63 percent.
“When asked to name the two countries that pose the greatest threat, the vast majority, about 80 percent, name the United States and Israel.”
Quotes: From synopsis titled, "Baghdad Shias Believe Killings May Increase Once U.S.-led Forces Depart but Large Majorities Still Support Withdrawal Within a Year"
[Blogger's Note: The full report can be viewed here.]
Most Shia Arabs living in Baghdad have shifted in recent months from preferring the open-ended deployment of foreign troops in Iraq to wanting a one-year timetable for withdrawal. Nonetheless, a growing majority of Shias in the conflict-ridden capital say that if U.S.-led forces leave within six months there could be an upsurge in inter-ethnic violence.
Eight out of ten Shias in Baghdad (80%) say they want foreign forces to leave within a year (72% of Shias in the rest of the country), according to a poll conducted by World Public Opinion in September. None of the Shias polled in Baghdad want U.S.-led troops to be reduced only “as the security situation improves,” a sharp decline from January, when 57 percent of the Shias polled by WPO in the capital city preferred an open-ended U.S presence.
Seven out of ten Iraqis overall—including both the Shia majority (74%) and the Sunni minority (91%)—say they want the United States to leave within a year.
Nonetheless, the number of Shias in Baghdad who fear an upsurge in violence if U.S. troops withdraw within too short a time span has risen a dramatic 52 points since the beginning of the year. Six out of ten Shias in Iraq’s capital city (59%) believe that sect-on-sect killings would rise in the event of a speedy U.S. withdrawal. This view contrasts with that of Shias in the rest of Iraq, where a majority (64%) thinks such violence would decline if U.S. troops departed in six months.
Outside of Baghdad, majorities of Shias and Sunnis have been consistently optimistic about the consequences of a U.S. withdrawal. In January, 56 percent of Shias said inter-ethnic violence would decrease (37% increase) if the U.S.-led forces pulled out while in September, 64 percent said it would decline (29% increase). Among Sunni Arabs, majorities in September (72%) and January (81%) said interethnic violence would decrease if U.S. troops withdrew in six months.
Fewer than one in ten Iraqis (9%) believe foreign forces should only be reduced “as the security situation improves,” a drop of 20 points since January. Support for this option has fallen especially steeply among Shias (from 29% to 5%) and Kurds (57% to 31%).
Nearly all Sunnis also oppose the indefinite presence of foreign forces (2% in favor). But while a majority of Sunnis (57%) still prefer that U.S.-led troops leave within six months, that percentage has declined 26 points since January when 83 percent wanted foreign forces out within half a year.
The number of Shias in the capital city and elsewhere who think Iraq is headed in the right direction has dropped considerably since the beginning of 2006. In January, nine out of ten Shias in Baghdad (88%) thought Iraq was on the right path. By September, three quarters (74%) did. Outside of Baghdad, the declining optimism among Shias has been even steeper. Eight-two percent thought Iraq was headed in the right direction in January while about half (52%) thought so by September.
Seven in ten Shias in Baghdad (71%) say Iraqi forces will be strong enough within six months to take over the country’s security should foreign troops withdraw. That’s an increase of 30 percent from January, when only 41 percent thought that Iraqis would be able to take on the country’s security challenges within six months. There is little difference of opinion on this between Shias in Baghdad (71%) and those elsewhere (66%).
All Shias polled in Baghdad (100%) believe that the U.S. military presence is “provoking more conflict than it is preventing.” Outside of Baghdad, this view is slightly less common: 74 percent of Shias in the rest of the country say the presence of U.S. troops provokes conflict while 25 percent say the troops are a stabilizing force.
At the same time, the number of Shias who approve of attacks on U.S.-led forces has jumped 24 points. In January, about a third of Shias (36%) polled in Baghdad expressed approval of such assaults. By September, the proportion of Shias in Baghdad saying they approved of striking American-led forces had risen to 60 percent. In the rest of the country, Shia support for attacking foreign troops rose 20 points, from 43 percent to 63 percent.
“When asked to name the two countries that pose the greatest threat, the vast majority, about 80 percent, name the United States and Israel.”
UN RhetIraq: Iraqi Civilian Death Toll
Who: United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)
Source: IRIN
Quotes: From article titled, "IRAQ: More than 3,700 civilians killed in October, UN reports"
The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) said on Wednesday that 3,709 Iraqi civilians were killed in October, describing it as the highest death toll since the beginning of the US-led occupation of the country in March 2003.
In its latest human rights report for September and October, UNAMI said the increase was the result of the growing influence of armed militias and rampant torture “despite the Government’s commitment to address human rights abuse”.
UNAMI added that the report was based on figures released by the Iraqi Health Ministry, hospitals throughout the country and the Medico-Legal Institute in Baghdad.
The report stated that just over 7,000 civilians were killed in September and October, including 351 women and 110 children. October’s figure was nearly 120 more than July’s, which had been the previous highest death toll.
Source: IRIN
Quotes: From article titled, "IRAQ: More than 3,700 civilians killed in October, UN reports"
The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) said on Wednesday that 3,709 Iraqi civilians were killed in October, describing it as the highest death toll since the beginning of the US-led occupation of the country in March 2003.
In its latest human rights report for September and October, UNAMI said the increase was the result of the growing influence of armed militias and rampant torture “despite the Government’s commitment to address human rights abuse”.
UNAMI added that the report was based on figures released by the Iraqi Health Ministry, hospitals throughout the country and the Medico-Legal Institute in Baghdad.
The report stated that just over 7,000 civilians were killed in September and October, including 351 women and 110 children. October’s figure was nearly 120 more than July’s, which had been the previous highest death toll.
Monday, November 20, 2006
News RhetIraq: Hersh on CIA vs. Bush Administration over Iran
Who: Seymour Hersh
Source: The New Yorker
Quotes: From article titled, "THE NEXT ACT - Is a damaged Administration less likely to attack Iran, or more?"
The Administration’s planning for a military attack on Iran was made far more complicated earlier this fall by a highly classified draft assessment by the C.I.A. challenging the White House’s assumptions about how close Iran might be to building a nuclear bomb. The C.I.A. found no conclusive evidence, as yet, of a secret Iranian nuclear-weapons program running parallel to the civilian operations that Iran has declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency. (The C.I.A. declined to comment on this story.)
The C.I.A.’s analysis, which has been circulated to other agencies for comment, was based on technical intelligence collected by overhead satellites, and on other empirical evidence, such as measurements of the radioactivity of water samples and smoke plumes from factories and power plants. Additional data have been gathered, intelligence sources told me, by high-tech (and highly classified) radioactivity-detection devices that clandestine American and Israeli agents placed near suspected nuclear-weapons facilities inside Iran in the past year or so. No significant amounts of radioactivity were found.
A current senior intelligence official confirmed the existence of the C.I.A. analysis, and told me that the White House had been hostile to it. The White House’s dismissal of the C.I.A. findings on Iran is widely known in the intelligence community. Cheney and his aides discounted the assessment, the former senior intelligence official said. “They’re not looking for a smoking gun,” the official added, referring to specific intelligence about Iranian nuclear planning. “They’re looking for the degree of comfort level they think they need to accomplish the mission.” The Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency also challenged the C.I.A.’s analysis. “The D.I.A. is fighting the agency’s conclusions, and disputing its approach,” the former senior intelligence official said. Bush and Cheney, he added, can try to prevent the C.I.A. assessment from being incorporated into a forthcoming National Intelligence Estimate on Iranian nuclear capabilities, “but they can’t stop the agency from putting it out for comment inside the intelligence community.” The C.I.A. assessment warned the White House that it would be a mistake to conclude that the failure to find a secret nuclear-weapons program in Iran merely meant that the Iranians had done a good job of hiding it. The former senior intelligence official noted that at the height of the Cold War the Soviets were equally skilled at deception and misdirection, yet the American intelligence community was readily able to unravel the details of their long-range-missile and nuclear-weapons programs. But some in the White House, including in Cheney’s office, had made just such an assumption—that “the lack of evidence means they must have it,” the former official said.
Source: The New Yorker
Quotes: From article titled, "THE NEXT ACT - Is a damaged Administration less likely to attack Iran, or more?"
The Administration’s planning for a military attack on Iran was made far more complicated earlier this fall by a highly classified draft assessment by the C.I.A. challenging the White House’s assumptions about how close Iran might be to building a nuclear bomb. The C.I.A. found no conclusive evidence, as yet, of a secret Iranian nuclear-weapons program running parallel to the civilian operations that Iran has declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency. (The C.I.A. declined to comment on this story.)
The C.I.A.’s analysis, which has been circulated to other agencies for comment, was based on technical intelligence collected by overhead satellites, and on other empirical evidence, such as measurements of the radioactivity of water samples and smoke plumes from factories and power plants. Additional data have been gathered, intelligence sources told me, by high-tech (and highly classified) radioactivity-detection devices that clandestine American and Israeli agents placed near suspected nuclear-weapons facilities inside Iran in the past year or so. No significant amounts of radioactivity were found.
A current senior intelligence official confirmed the existence of the C.I.A. analysis, and told me that the White House had been hostile to it. The White House’s dismissal of the C.I.A. findings on Iran is widely known in the intelligence community. Cheney and his aides discounted the assessment, the former senior intelligence official said. “They’re not looking for a smoking gun,” the official added, referring to specific intelligence about Iranian nuclear planning. “They’re looking for the degree of comfort level they think they need to accomplish the mission.” The Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency also challenged the C.I.A.’s analysis. “The D.I.A. is fighting the agency’s conclusions, and disputing its approach,” the former senior intelligence official said. Bush and Cheney, he added, can try to prevent the C.I.A. assessment from being incorporated into a forthcoming National Intelligence Estimate on Iranian nuclear capabilities, “but they can’t stop the agency from putting it out for comment inside the intelligence community.” The C.I.A. assessment warned the White House that it would be a mistake to conclude that the failure to find a secret nuclear-weapons program in Iran merely meant that the Iranians had done a good job of hiding it. The former senior intelligence official noted that at the height of the Cold War the Soviets were equally skilled at deception and misdirection, yet the American intelligence community was readily able to unravel the details of their long-range-missile and nuclear-weapons programs. But some in the White House, including in Cheney’s office, had made just such an assumption—that “the lack of evidence means they must have it,” the former official said.
Sunday, November 19, 2006
Pundit RhetIraq: Kissinger on Iraq
Who: Henry Kissinger
Source: Associated Press via MyWay.com
Quotes: From article titled, "Kissinger: Iraq Military Win Impossible"
Military victory is no longer possible in Iraq, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said in a television interview broadcast Sunday.
Kissinger presented a bleak vision of Iraq, saying the U.S. government must enter into dialogue with Iraq's regional neighbors - including Iran - if progress is to be made in the region.
"If you mean by 'military victory' an Iraqi government that can be established and whose writ runs across the whole country, that gets the civil war under control and sectarian violence under control in a time period that the political processes of the democracies will support, I don't believe that is possible," he told the British Broadcasting Corp.
But Kissinger, an architect of the Vietnam war who has advised President Bush about Iraq, warned against a rapid withdrawal of coalition troops, saying it could destabilize Iraq's neighbors and cause a long-lasting conflict.
"A dramatic collapse of Iraq - whatever we think about how the situation was created - would have disastrous consequences for which we would pay for many years and which would bring us back, one way or another, into the region," he said.
Kissinger, whose views have been sought by the Iraqi Study Group, led by former Secretary of State James Baker III, called for an international conference bringing together the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, Iraq's neighbors - including Iran - and regional powers like India and Pakistan to work out a way forward for the region.
"I think we have to redefine the course, but I don't think that the alternative is between military victory, as defined previously, or total withdrawal," he said.
Source: Associated Press via MyWay.com
Quotes: From article titled, "Kissinger: Iraq Military Win Impossible"
Military victory is no longer possible in Iraq, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said in a television interview broadcast Sunday.
Kissinger presented a bleak vision of Iraq, saying the U.S. government must enter into dialogue with Iraq's regional neighbors - including Iran - if progress is to be made in the region.
"If you mean by 'military victory' an Iraqi government that can be established and whose writ runs across the whole country, that gets the civil war under control and sectarian violence under control in a time period that the political processes of the democracies will support, I don't believe that is possible," he told the British Broadcasting Corp.
But Kissinger, an architect of the Vietnam war who has advised President Bush about Iraq, warned against a rapid withdrawal of coalition troops, saying it could destabilize Iraq's neighbors and cause a long-lasting conflict.
"A dramatic collapse of Iraq - whatever we think about how the situation was created - would have disastrous consequences for which we would pay for many years and which would bring us back, one way or another, into the region," he said.
Kissinger, whose views have been sought by the Iraqi Study Group, led by former Secretary of State James Baker III, called for an international conference bringing together the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, Iraq's neighbors - including Iran - and regional powers like India and Pakistan to work out a way forward for the region.
"I think we have to redefine the course, but I don't think that the alternative is between military victory, as defined previously, or total withdrawal," he said.
ex-Bush Admin RhetIraq: Adelman Reflects on Iraq Policy
Who: Ken Adelman, ex-member of the Defense Policy Board
Source: The Washington Post
Quotes: From article titled, "Embittered Insiders Turn Against Bush"
[...] Adelman has broken with the Bush team. He had an angry falling-out with Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld this fall. He and Cheney are no longer on speaking terms. And he believes that "the president is ultimately responsible" for what Adelman now calls "the debacle that was Iraq."
"There are a lot of lives that are lost," Adelman said in an interview last week. "A country's at stake. A region's at stake. This is a gigantic situation. . . . This didn't have to be managed this bad. It's just awful."
Few of the original promoters of the war have grown as disenchanted as Adelman. The chief of Reagan's arms control agency, Adelman has been close to Cheney and Rumsfeld for decades and even worked for Rumsfeld at one point. As a member of the Defense Policy Board, he wrote in The Washington Post before the Iraq war that it would be "a cakewalk."
But in interviews with Vanity Fair, the New Yorker and The Post, Adelman said he became unhappy about the conduct of the war soon after his ebullient night at Cheney's residence in 2003. The failure to find weapons of mass destruction disturbed him. He said he was disgusted by the failure to stop the looting that followed Hussein's fall and by Rumsfeld's casual dismissal of it with the phrase "stuff happens." The breaking point, he said, was Bush's decision to award Medals of Freedom to occupation chief L. Paul Bremer, Gen. Tommy R. Franks and then-CIA Director George J. Tenet.
"The three individuals who got the highest civilian medals the president can give were responsible for a lot of the debacle that was Iraq," Adelman said. All told, he said, the Bush national security team has proved to be "the most incompetent" of the past half-century. But, he added, "Obviously, the president is ultimately responsible."
Adelman said he remained silent for so long out of loyalty. "I didn't want to bad-mouth the administration," he said. In private, though, he spoke out, resulting in a furious confrontation with Rumsfeld, who summoned him to the Pentagon in September and demanded his resignation from the defense board.
"It seemed like nobody was getting it," Adelman said. "It seemed like everything was locked in. It seemed like everything was stuck." He agrees he bears blame as well. "I think that's fair. When you advocate a policy that turns bad, you do have some responsibility."
Most troubling, he said, are his shattered ideals: "The whole philosophy of using American strength for good in the world, for a foreign policy that is really value-based instead of balanced-power-based, I don't think is disproven by Iraq. But it's certainly discredited."
Source: The Washington Post
Quotes: From article titled, "Embittered Insiders Turn Against Bush"
[...] Adelman has broken with the Bush team. He had an angry falling-out with Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld this fall. He and Cheney are no longer on speaking terms. And he believes that "the president is ultimately responsible" for what Adelman now calls "the debacle that was Iraq."
"There are a lot of lives that are lost," Adelman said in an interview last week. "A country's at stake. A region's at stake. This is a gigantic situation. . . . This didn't have to be managed this bad. It's just awful."
Few of the original promoters of the war have grown as disenchanted as Adelman. The chief of Reagan's arms control agency, Adelman has been close to Cheney and Rumsfeld for decades and even worked for Rumsfeld at one point. As a member of the Defense Policy Board, he wrote in The Washington Post before the Iraq war that it would be "a cakewalk."
But in interviews with Vanity Fair, the New Yorker and The Post, Adelman said he became unhappy about the conduct of the war soon after his ebullient night at Cheney's residence in 2003. The failure to find weapons of mass destruction disturbed him. He said he was disgusted by the failure to stop the looting that followed Hussein's fall and by Rumsfeld's casual dismissal of it with the phrase "stuff happens." The breaking point, he said, was Bush's decision to award Medals of Freedom to occupation chief L. Paul Bremer, Gen. Tommy R. Franks and then-CIA Director George J. Tenet.
"The three individuals who got the highest civilian medals the president can give were responsible for a lot of the debacle that was Iraq," Adelman said. All told, he said, the Bush national security team has proved to be "the most incompetent" of the past half-century. But, he added, "Obviously, the president is ultimately responsible."
Adelman said he remained silent for so long out of loyalty. "I didn't want to bad-mouth the administration," he said. In private, though, he spoke out, resulting in a furious confrontation with Rumsfeld, who summoned him to the Pentagon in September and demanded his resignation from the defense board.
"It seemed like nobody was getting it," Adelman said. "It seemed like everything was locked in. It seemed like everything was stuck." He agrees he bears blame as well. "I think that's fair. When you advocate a policy that turns bad, you do have some responsibility."
Most troubling, he said, are his shattered ideals: "The whole philosophy of using American strength for good in the world, for a foreign policy that is really value-based instead of balanced-power-based, I don't think is disproven by Iraq. But it's certainly discredited."
Monday, November 13, 2006
UN News RhetIraq: Karbala Province Conditions for Families Displaced
Source: Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)
Quotes: From article titled, "Karbala says it will not host additional displaced families"
Iraq's Karbala province, 80 km south of the capital Baghdad, is overwhelmed with displaced families and can no longer host and provide services for an additional influx, a local official said on Monday.
"The province is suffering under the pressure of the increasing number of displaced families. Service directorates like health, education and municipality are no longer capable of meeting the needs of more [displaced] families," Ghalib al-Daami, a member of Karbala Provincial Council, told IRIN.
Al-Daami said that as of Saturday the council took the decision to stop hosting displaced families, other then those who could afford to rent houses or those who could take refuge with relatives.
“They should stay at camps unless the government helps with building more hospitals, schools and other service directorates. For example, there are more than 11,000 pupils attending the province’s schools and this costs us a lot," he added.
The provincial office of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society (IRCS) said that 70 percent of nearly 8,000 displaced families, about 50,000 individuals, are living in tents at the IRCS camp in the city's main park, in mosques as well as in abandoned government buildings.
Quotes: From article titled, "Karbala says it will not host additional displaced families"
Iraq's Karbala province, 80 km south of the capital Baghdad, is overwhelmed with displaced families and can no longer host and provide services for an additional influx, a local official said on Monday.
"The province is suffering under the pressure of the increasing number of displaced families. Service directorates like health, education and municipality are no longer capable of meeting the needs of more [displaced] families," Ghalib al-Daami, a member of Karbala Provincial Council, told IRIN.
Al-Daami said that as of Saturday the council took the decision to stop hosting displaced families, other then those who could afford to rent houses or those who could take refuge with relatives.
“They should stay at camps unless the government helps with building more hospitals, schools and other service directorates. For example, there are more than 11,000 pupils attending the province’s schools and this costs us a lot," he added.
The provincial office of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society (IRCS) said that 70 percent of nearly 8,000 displaced families, about 50,000 individuals, are living in tents at the IRCS camp in the city's main park, in mosques as well as in abandoned government buildings.
Friday, November 03, 2006
Pundit RhetIraq: Ralph Peters on the Chance for Democracy in Iraq
Who: Ralph Peters, retired US Army Intelligence Officer
Source: USA Today
Quotes: From opinion article titled, "Last gasps in Iraq"
I supported the removal of Saddam Hussein. I believed that Arabs deserved a chance to build a rule-of-law democracy in the Middle East. Based upon firsthand experience, I was convinced that the Middle East was so politically, socially, morally and intellectually stagnant that we had to risk intervention — or face generations of terrorism and tumult. I still believe that our removal of Hussein was a noble act.
Iraq is failing. No honest observer can conclude otherwise. Even six months ago, there was hope. Now the chances for a democratic, unified Iraq are dwindling fast.
[Blogger's Note: The above reference to six months ago is an interesting one as Mr. Peters penned a series of opinion articles in March 2006 titled, "Dude, Where's My Civil War?", "Iraq, the Untold Truths" and "Myths of Iraq" that painted a positive light on circumstances in Iraq.]
Iraq still deserves one last chance — as long as we don't confuse deadly stubbornness and perseverance. If, at this late hour, Iraqis in decisive numbers prove willing to fight for their own freedom and a constitutional government, we should be willing to remain for a generation. If they continue to revel in fratricidal slaughter, we must leave.
My disillusionment with our Iraq endeavor began last summer, when I was invited to a high-level discussion with administration officials. I went into the meeting with one firm goal, to convince my hosts that they'd better have Plan B in case Iraq continued to disintegrate. I left the session convinced that the administration still didn't have Plan A, only a blur of meandering policies and blind hopes. After more than three years, it was still “An Evening at the Improv.”
Iraq could have turned out differently. It didn't. And we must be honest about it. We owe that much to our troops. They don't face the mere forfeiture of a few congressional seats but the loss of their lives. Our military is now being employed for political purposes. It's unworthy of our nation.
[Blogger's Note: The last paragraph is an interesting one compared to the following written within another Peter's opinion penned nearly one-year ago titled, "How to Lose a War";
"Forget about our dead soldiers, whose sacrifice is nothing but a political club for Democrats to wave in front of the media. After all, one way to create the kind of disaffection in the ranks that the Dems' leaders yearn to see is to tell our troops on the battlefield that they're risking their lives for nothing, we're throwing the game."]
Source: USA Today
Quotes: From opinion article titled, "Last gasps in Iraq"
I supported the removal of Saddam Hussein. I believed that Arabs deserved a chance to build a rule-of-law democracy in the Middle East. Based upon firsthand experience, I was convinced that the Middle East was so politically, socially, morally and intellectually stagnant that we had to risk intervention — or face generations of terrorism and tumult. I still believe that our removal of Hussein was a noble act.
Iraq is failing. No honest observer can conclude otherwise. Even six months ago, there was hope. Now the chances for a democratic, unified Iraq are dwindling fast.
[Blogger's Note: The above reference to six months ago is an interesting one as Mr. Peters penned a series of opinion articles in March 2006 titled, "Dude, Where's My Civil War?", "Iraq, the Untold Truths" and "Myths of Iraq" that painted a positive light on circumstances in Iraq.]
Iraq still deserves one last chance — as long as we don't confuse deadly stubbornness and perseverance. If, at this late hour, Iraqis in decisive numbers prove willing to fight for their own freedom and a constitutional government, we should be willing to remain for a generation. If they continue to revel in fratricidal slaughter, we must leave.
My disillusionment with our Iraq endeavor began last summer, when I was invited to a high-level discussion with administration officials. I went into the meeting with one firm goal, to convince my hosts that they'd better have Plan B in case Iraq continued to disintegrate. I left the session convinced that the administration still didn't have Plan A, only a blur of meandering policies and blind hopes. After more than three years, it was still “An Evening at the Improv.”
Iraq could have turned out differently. It didn't. And we must be honest about it. We owe that much to our troops. They don't face the mere forfeiture of a few congressional seats but the loss of their lives. Our military is now being employed for political purposes. It's unworthy of our nation.
[Blogger's Note: The last paragraph is an interesting one compared to the following written within another Peter's opinion penned nearly one-year ago titled, "How to Lose a War";
"Forget about our dead soldiers, whose sacrifice is nothing but a political club for Democrats to wave in front of the media. After all, one way to create the kind of disaffection in the ranks that the Dems' leaders yearn to see is to tell our troops on the battlefield that they're risking their lives for nothing, we're throwing the game."]
